托馬斯·皮克提的新書《21世紀資本論》最近引起了不小的轟動。他主張采取累進稅制和全球財富稅的手段，作為遏制資本主義趨向于“世襲”式狀態的唯一途徑，這種“世襲”形式的特點在于他所謂的“可怕的”財富與收入的不平等。他還通過翔實的、無可辯駁的細節，證明了在過去兩個世紀，財富與收入兩者間的社會不平等是如何演變的，其中特別強調了財富的地位。他摧毀了人們關于自由市場資本主義的普遍觀念：認為它廣布財富，認為它是保衛個人自由的堅強壁壘。皮克提向我們表明，自由市場資本主義在沒有受到國家大的再分配干預的情況下，就產生了反民主的寡頭。他的論證令自由主義者義憤填膺，讓華爾街日報暴跳如雷。
這本書往往被視作卡爾·馬克思19世紀那本具有相同標題的著作在21世紀的替代物。皮克提實際的論述確證了他沒有這種意圖，因為他的書根本不是一本關于資本的著作。這本書沒有告訴我們08年金融崩盤的原因，也沒有告訴我們為什么會有那么多的人耗時那么久來擺脫長期失業和房產絕贖這雙重負擔。它無助于我們理解為什么現在美國經濟增長如此遲緩，與中國情況完全相反，也無助于我們理解歐洲陷于經濟停滯的和財政緊縮政策的原因。皮克提在統計學上向我們表明了(我們應當對他和他的同事們在這里所做的工作表示感激)資本在其整個歷史中，趨向于產生程度越來越大的不平等。對于我們大多數人來說，這恐怕不是新聞。事實上，馬克思在他的《資本論》第一卷中就已得出了同樣的理論性結論。皮克提沒有提到這一點并不奇怪：面對那些將他稱作一個偽裝的馬克思主義者的右翼媒體的指責，皮克提聲稱他并未讀過馬克思的《資本論》。
皮克提搜集了很多數據來支持他的論述。他關于收入和財富之間差異的說明是令人信服的，對我們很有幫助。同時，他還提出了一個深思熟慮的建議：將遺產稅、累進稅制和全球財富稅等措施，作為應對財富和權力進一步集中的一劑可行的良藥(不過幾乎可以肯定，這在政治上是不可行的)。
但不平等隨著時間的推移而加劇的這種趨勢為什么會出現呢?從他的數據中(同時也摻進了一些簡·奧斯汀和巴爾扎克的美文學典故)，皮克提得出了據以解釋所發生狀況的數學規律：那著名的1%(“占領華爾街”運動使得這個術語通行)，他們的財富的日益積累是起因于這樣一個簡單的事實：資本的回報率(r)始終超過收入的增長率(g)。皮克提說這現在是而且過去一直是資本的“核心矛盾”。
但這種統計上的規整還并不構成充分的解釋，更別說是成為一個規律了。照他所言，那么是什么力量產生并維持了這樣一個矛盾呢?皮克提并沒有說。規律歸規律，原因歸原因，互不相干。馬克思則旗幟鮮明地將這種規律的存在，歸因于資方和勞方之間權力的不平衡，而這種解釋依然成立。自20世紀70年代以來，由于資方動用技術、失業、外包和反勞方政策(如瑪格麗特·撒切爾和羅納德·里根)來壓垮了所有反資方勢力，勞方的政治和經濟權力下降，從而勞方占國民收入的比例也持續下降。瑪格麗特·撒切爾的經濟顧問艾倫·巴德，在某個不經意間承認了80年代的反通脹政策已被證明是“增加失業的絕佳方式，而增加失業是減弱工人階級力量的絕佳方式……增加失業所做的事情，用馬克思主義術語來說就是資本主義的危機，這種危機重建勞動后備軍、讓資本家獲得更高的利潤。”在1970年，工人平均薪酬與CEO薪酬之間的比例約1：30，現在穩超1：300，而在麥當勞則達到了約1：1200。
但就在《資本論》第二卷中(皮克提也沒讀過，甘愿拒斥它)，馬克思指出了資本傾向于壓低工資會使得商品銷售市場在一定時候出現萎縮。亨利·福特很久以前就承認了這種兩難局面，而與此同時他對雇傭工人實行日薪5美元的8小時工作日制度，按照他的說法這是為了刺激消費需求。許多人認為有效需求不足是導致30年代出現大蕭條的基礎。這在二戰后激發了凱恩斯主義的擴張性政策，而在強勁需求所帶動的增長當中，收入之于財富的不平等狀況一定程度上縮小了(雖說收入相較于財富而言并不算多)。但這種解決問題的辦法，有賴于勞方權力的相對擴大、有賴于 “社會國家”(皮克提的術語)的建設，累進稅制為這種建設提供了資金支持。皮克提寫道：“1932年-1980年這將近半個世紀的時期內，美國聯邦所得稅的最高稅率平均達到81%。”而這種稅率并未抑制經濟增長(這是皮克提駁斥右翼理念的另一項證據)。
到60年代末，許多資本家都開始意識到需要對勞方權力過大采取措施，這些措施包括把凱恩斯逐出偉大經濟學家的廟堂，包括轉投米爾頓·弗里德曼的供給學派，包括穩定稅率(即使不能減稅的話)，而這最后一項就可以解構“社會國家”、約束勞方權力。1980年后，美國的最高稅率下降，資本收益的稅率更是低得多(資本收益是超級富豪收入的主要來源)，這就極大促進了財富向最上層1%的流動。皮克提向我們表明，減稅對于經濟增長的效果幾乎可以忽略不計。因此，所謂利益在社會階層中自上而下傳遞的“涓滴效應”(這是右翼所摯愛的另一個理念)并不成立。上述一切情況都不是由數學規律決定的，這都是政治問題。
經歷輪回之后問題變得更加迫切：需求在哪里?皮克提的體系當中忽視了這個問題。90年代的信貸巨大擴張，包括拓展次級市場的抵押貸款，蒙混過了這個問題。但由此產生的資產泡沫注定要破裂，就像07-08年那樣，那次泡沫破裂就擊垮了雷曼兄弟公司及其所牽涉的信貸系統。然而在09年后，利潤率就迅速恢復了，私人財富的進一步集中也恢復了，盡管與此同時其他的人們其他的事業都還限于困頓。美國現在的企業利潤率是史上最高，企業積壓了大筆現金而不愿花出去，因為市場環境不旺。
皮克提對數學規律的闡明，一定程度上揭示了數學規律所蘊含的階級政治，但更多的是掩蓋了這種政治。如同沃倫·巴菲特所指出的：“這里無疑有階級斗爭，我所屬的富人階級制造了這場斗爭，并且不斷贏得這場斗爭。”說他們獲勝的一個重要標準，就是頂層的1%所據有的財富和收入，較之其他人的差距在不斷擴大。
然而，在皮克提的論述中存在一個核心難題，這是建立在他對資本的錯誤定義基礎上的。資本是一個過程，而不是一個事物【編者注：恩格斯《費爾巴哈論》歸納黑格爾的辯證法思想說：“一個偉大的基本思想，即認為世界不是既成事物的集合體，而是過程的集合體，其中各個似乎穩定的事物……處在生成和滅亡的不斷變化中”】。它是一個流通過程，在流通過程中常常是“用錢生錢”，而不限于通過對勞動力的剝削來生錢。皮克提將資本定義為私人、企業和政府所持有的所有資產的股份，這些股份可以進行市場交易而無論這資產是否正在被使用。這樣定義出的資本還包括土地、房地產和知識產權，以及我的藝術類和珠寶類收藏品。如何確定所有這些東西的價值在技術上是一個難題，沒有公認的解答。為計算出一個有意義的回報率r，我們必須以某種方式確定初始資本的價值。不幸的是，要確定初始資本的價值，總得依賴于用這資本所生產出的商品和服務的價值，或者依賴于這資本在市場上的能賣出什么價。整個新古典經濟學的思想(這是皮克提思考的基礎)就是建立在一個循環論證基礎上的。資本的回報率取決于增長率，因為資本的價值要通過它生產出的產品來確定，而不是通過用以生產出它本身的東西來確定。資本的價值深受投機環境的影響，還會被著名的“非理性繁榮”所嚴重扭曲，格林斯潘就指出了股票和房地產市場的“非理性繁榮”的特征。如果我們將房地產——更不用說對沖基金經理所投資的藝術收藏品的價值——從資本的定義當中去掉(將其包含在內本身根據就很薄弱)，那么皮克提有關于財富和收入差距擴大的解釋就將完全失敗——盡管他對過去和現在的不平等狀況的描述仍然成立。
貨幣、土地、房地產和未用于現時生產的廠房與設備都不是資本。如果現時正在使用的資本的回報率較高，那是因為資本的一部分被從流通中抽出而不再投入。限制新投資的資本供應(我們現在正看到這種現象)，確保了流通中資本的高回報率。創造這種人為的稀缺性并不只是石油公司用以確保其高回報率的專利：一旦有機會一切資本都會這樣做。這就是資本回報率(不管它如何被定義和衡量)總是超過收入的增長率的那種趨勢的基礎。這就是資本確保其自身再生產的方式，而絲毫不顧其后果會引起人類其他人何等樣的痛苦。這就是資產階級的生存方式。
皮克提的數據富有價值，但他對于不平等和寡頭化趨勢出現的解釋則有著嚴重缺陷。他關于補救不平等狀況的建議，如果不說是空想的，那么也是幼稚的。當然，他就也沒有為21世紀的資本提供出有效模型。因此，我們仍然需要馬克思，或者馬克思的當代化身。
附：英文原文
Afterthoughts on Piketty’s Capital
Afterthoughts on Piketty’s Capital
Source: davidharvey.org
David Harvey
Thomas Piketty has written a book called Capital that has caused quite a stir. He advocates progressive taxation and a global wealth tax as the only way to counter the trend towards the creation of a “patrimonial” form of capitalism marked by what he dubs “terrifying” inequalities of wealth and income. He also documents in excruciating and hard to rebut detail how social inequality of both wealth and income has evolved over the last two centuries, with particular emphasis on the role of wealth. He demolishes the widely-held view that free market capitalism spreads the wealth around and that it is the great bulwark for the defense of individual liberties and freedoms. Free-market capitalism, in the absence of any major redistributive interventions on the part of the state, Piketty shows, produces anti-democratic oligarchies. This demonstration has given sustenance to liberal outrage as it drives the Wall Street Journal apoplectic.
The book has often been presented as a twenty-first century substitute for Karl Marx’s nineteenth century work of the same title. Piketty actually denies this was his intention, which is just as well since his is not a book about capital at all. It does not tell us why the crash of 2008 occurred and why it is taking so long for so many people to get out from under the dual burdens of prolonged unemployment and millions of houses lost to foreclosure. It does not help us understand why growth is currently so sluggish in the US as opposed to China and why Europe is locked down in a politics of austerity and an economy of stagnation. What Piketty does show statistically (and we should be indebted to him and his colleagues for this) is that capital has tended throughout its history to produce ever-greater levels of inequality. This is, for many of us, hardly news. It was, moreover, exactly Marx’s theoretical conclusion in Volume One of his version of Capital. Piketty fails to note this, which is not surprising since he has since claimed, in the face of accusations in the right wing press that he is a Marxist in disguise, not to have read Marx’s Capital.
Piketty assembles a lot of data to support his arguments. His account of the differences between income and wealth is persuasive and helpful. And he gives a thoughtful defense of inheritance taxes, progressive taxation and a global wealth tax as possible (though almost certainly not politically viable) antidotes to the further concentration of wealth and power.
But why does this trend towards greater inequality over time occur? From his data (spiced up with some neat literary allusions to Jane Austen and Balzac) he derives a mathematical law to explain what happens: the ever-increasing accumulation of wealth on the part of the famous one percent (a term popularized thanks of course to the “Occupy” movement) is due to the simple fact that the rate of return on capital (r) always exceeds the rate of growth of income (g). This, says Piketty, is and always has been “the central contradiction” of capital.
But a statistical regularity of this sort hardly constitutes an adequate explanation let alone a law. So what forces produce and sustain such a contradiction? Piketty does not say. The law is the law and that is that. Marx would obviously have attributed the existence of such a law to the imbalance of power between capital and labor. And that explanation still holds water. The steady decline in labor’s share of national income since the 1970s derived from the declining political and economic power of labor as capital mobilized technologies, unemployment, off-shoring and anti-labor politics (such as those of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) to crush all opposition. As Alan Budd, an economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher confessed in an unguarded moment, anti-inflation policies of the 1980s turned out to be “a very good way to raise unemployment, and raising unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes…what was engineered there in Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism which recreated a reserve army of labour and has allowed capitalists to make high profits ever since.” The disparity in remuneration between average workers and CEO’s stood at around thirty to one in 1970. It now is well above three hundred to one and in the case of MacDonalds about 1200 to one.
But in Volume 2 of Marx’s Capital (which Piketty also has not read even as he cheerfully dismisses it) Marx pointed out that capital’s penchant for driving wages down would at some point restrict the capacity of the market to absorb capital’s product. Henry Ford recognized this dilemma long ago when he mandated the $5 eight-hour day for his workers in order, he said, to boost consumer demand. Many thought that lack of effective demand underpinned the Great Depression of the 1930s. This inspired Keynesian expansionary policies after World War Two and resulted in some reductions in inequalities of incomes (though not so much of wealth) in the midst of strong demand led growth. But this solution rested on the relative empowerment of labor and the construction of the “social state” (Piketty’s term) funded by progressive taxation. “All told,” he writes, “over the period 1932-1980, nearly half a century, the top federal income tax in the United States averaged 81 percent.” And this did not in any way dampen growth (another piece of Piketty’s evidence that rebuts right wing beliefs).
By the end of the 1960s it became clear to many capitalists that they needed to do something about the excessive power of labor. Hence the demotion of Keynes from the pantheon of respectable economists, the switch to the supply side thinking of Milton Friedman, the crusade to stabilize if not reduce taxation, to deconstruct the social state and to discipline the forces of labor. After 1980 top tax rates came down and capital gains – a major source of income for the ultra-wealthy – were taxed at a much lower rate in the US, hugely boosting the flow of wealth to the top one percent. But the impact on growth, Piketty shows, was negligible. So “trickle down” of benefits from the rich to the rest (another right wing favorite belief) does not work. None of this was dictated by any mathematical law. It was all about politics.
But then the wheel turned full circle and the more pressing question became: where is the demand? Piketty systematically ignores this question. The 1990s fudged the answer by a vast expansion of credit, including the extension of mortgage finance into sub-prime markets. But the resultant asset bubble was bound to go pop as it did in 2007-8 bringing down Lehman Brothers and the credit system with it. However, profit rates and the further concentration of private wealth recovered very quickly after 2009 while everything and everyone else did badly. Profit rates of businesses are now as high as they have ever been in the US. Businesses are sitting on oodles of cash and refuse to spend it because market conditions are not robust.
Piketty’s formulation of the mathematical law disguises more than it reveals about the class politics involved. As Warren Buffett has noted, “sure there is class war, and it is my class, the rich, who are making it and we are winning.” One key measure of their victory is the growing disparities in wealth and income of the top one percent relative to everyone else.
There is, however, a central difficulty with Piketty’s argument. It rests on a mistaken definition of capital. Capital is a process not a thing. It is a process of circulation in which money is used to make more money often, but not exclusively through the exploitation of labor power. Piketty defines capital as the stock of all assets held by private individuals, corporations and governments that can be traded in the market no matter whether these assets are being used or not. This includes land, real estate and intellectual property rights as well as my art and jewelry collection. How to determine the value of all of these things is a difficult technical problem that has no agreed upon solution. In order to calculate a meaningful rate of return, r, we have to have some way of valuing the initial capital. Unfortunately there is no way to value it independently of the value of the goods and services it is used to produce or how much it can be sold for in the market. The whole of neo-classical economic thought (which is the basis of Piketty’s thinking) is founded on a tautology. The rate of return on capital depends crucially on the rate of growth because capital is valued by way of that which it produces and not by what went into its production. Its value is heavily influenced by speculative conditions and can be seriously warped by the famous “irrational exuberance” that Greenspan spotted as characteristic of stock and housing markets. If we subtract housing and real estate – to say nothing of the value of the art collections of the hedge funders – from the definition of capital (and the rationale for their inclusion is rather weak) then Piketty’s explanation for increasing disparities in wealth and income would fall flat on its face, though his descriptions of the state of past and present inequalities would still stand.
Money, land, real estate and plant and equipment that are not being used productively are not capital. If the rate of return on the capital that is being used is high then this is because a part of capital is withdrawn from circulation and in effect goes on strike. Restricting the supply of capital to new investment (a phenomena we are now witnessing) ensures a high rate of return on that capital which is in circulation. The creation of such artificial scarcity is not only what the oil companies do to ensure their high rate of return: it is what all capital does when given the chance. This is what underpins the tendency for the rate of return on capital (no matter how it is defined and measured) to always exceed the rate of growth of income. This is how capital ensures its own reproduction, no matter how uncomfortable the consequences are for the rest of us. And this is how the capitalist class lives.
There is much that is valuable in Piketty’s data sets. But his explanation as to why the inequalities and oligarchic tendencies arise is seriously flawed. His proposals as to the remedies for the inequalities are naïve if not utopian. And he has certainly not produced a working model for capital of the twenty-first century. For that we still need Marx or his modern-day equivalent.
David Harvey is a Distinguished Professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His most recent book is Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, published by Profile Press in London and Oxford University Press in New York.
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