齊澤克：占領運動、左翼復興和今日馬克思主義

　　創辦于2007年11月的美國左翼網絡雜志《鴨嘴獸評論》(Platypus Review)在第42期(2011年 12月1日)刊載了荷蘭左翼學者哈西卜•艾哈邁德(Haseeb Ahmed)采訪斯洛文尼亞學者、歐洲著名哲學家和社會批判家斯拉沃熱•齊澤克的文章《占領運動、左翼復興和今日馬克思主義》。齊澤克在訪談中認為，“占領華爾街”等社會運動暴露了資本主義的缺陷，資本主義已無法繼續維系其賴以存在的前提——平等與自由交換，更加專制的全球種族隔離社會與資本主義發展的沖突等方方面面的問題都在召喚左翼，但左翼在許多社會運動中卻沒能發揮應有的作用，所以要重振左翼，復興左翼運動

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　　艾哈邁德：在解放廣場集會和占領行動爆發后，我們是否正在經歷左翼的復興?如果確實如此，那么需要重新思考的歷史遺留問題是什么?

　　齊澤克：我想說，我的回答將非常謹慎。相對而論，是的。也就是說，我看待所有這些事件的方式完全是自發的，如同人們自發地發起運動一樣。例如，把解放廣場集會簡單地看成是對民主的訴求，然而，其中有著一種更深層次的社會不滿。我看到一個充滿希望的跡象是，這些抗議不再是簡單地為了這樣或那樣的目的。這里面存在一些尚不清晰的認識，即這個社會體系本身有問題。我指的是資本主義制度。

　　其二，標準的多黨政治民主不是我們處理問題的方式。現在的問題是：我們確實是在大量地“反資本主義”，但卻只是在道德層面上。在各種媒體上，到處都可以看到某家公司如何剝削人、破壞環境以及某家銀行如何毀掉勞動人民的基金這樣的故事。所有這些都是扭曲的說教式的批評而已。這是不夠的。反資本主義的大眾媒體仍然停留在通過既定的社會結構來解決問題這個層次上，比如通過新聞調查和民主改革等。但我有一種模糊的直覺，更多的危險已經降臨。對資本主義本身而言，現在的戰斗已經超越了對它的占領。

　　事件已然發生，那就需要有決定事件意義的關鍵戰斗。我認為像占領華爾街這類事件是關鍵性的，因為它們從另一方面揭示了問題出在資本主義本身。在20世紀，這是一個重要的話題，但是在最近幾十年，它從傳統左翼那里神秘地消失了，取而代之的是諸如種族主義和性別歧視這樣的具體問題。但是問題依舊存在。同時，我也認為，雖然如此，答案卻不再有效。這就是為什么——正如有些批評者和同情者已經注意到的——缺乏該做什么的具體建議的原因。

　　它提醒我們，事實如同我的朋友阿蘭·巴迪烏(Alain Badiou)所說的那樣，20世紀已經結束了。無論是國家社會主義和社會民主主義的福利國家，還是充滿希望的烏托邦左翼、“橫向聯合組織”、地方社區、直接民主、自我組織，我認為它們都沒有發揮作用。所以，我再次申明，這是一個很大的挑戰。又回到老問題上來了，我們沒有準備好迎接挑戰，這一點比以往任何時候都更加明確。如果你看一下溫和、自由的左翼，他們的主要方法就是把問題概念化，例如，在羅爾斯的《正義論》中，你可以看到，這一切對彌補這種反抗力量沒有效果。

　　最讓我驚訝的是，存在著如此之大的能量。我想，也許它會停下來，但看看它是如何在美國各地爆發的，連伊拉克戰爭和阿富汗戰爭的退伍軍人都加入了他們的行列。這是大新聞。這里存在著憤怒和不滿，其嚴重和強烈的程度是令人難以置信的，這顯然與通過既定途徑來解決傳統范圍的經濟抗議問題有所不同。這是一個令人贊嘆的、關鍵的時刻。這是一種抗爭的姿態。在這一問題上，我的口號是： “無需對話!”我們不接受這種與敵人對話的辯證法，那還為時尚早。還沒到“我們不會對話，我們就是要置你于死地”的地步，只是說如果我們要對話，就不得不使用某種語言，但是這將是敵人的語言。我們需要時間來構建、規劃我們自己的新話語。

　　艾哈邁德：仍然會是左翼的語言嗎?

　　齊澤克：是正統左翼的語言，也是美國實用主義左翼的語言，是“工會”的語言，也是“壓力集團”(pressure groups)的語言，如此等等，所有這一切都是不充分的。我認為這種力量來自占支配地位的資產階級所認同的反抗者的弱點。“這不是歇斯底里的抗議嗎?這幫家伙到底想要什么?”這就是它的偉大之所在。你不能簡單地說，這樣不合適。無論如何“我們只是民主地抗議”。有個辦法是：“請告訴我們，你想要什么?” “請把它轉變成具體的要求。”而且還有一種傳統嬉皮士狂歡節——我知道這并非主流——的邏輯。有人告訴我，在舊金山有人說：“我們在這里過得很快樂!”這些都是陷阱。但是，盡管如此，一些剛發生卻還沒有成型的事情還不錯。你必須像這樣開始。

　　與那些總是說在你行動之前就已知道你想要什么的人相比，如果你這樣說，“你有點歇斯底里了”。那么你是在按照支配者的邏輯與一個男人對話。就像一個支配者問一個歇斯底里的女人：“告訴我你想要什么!”不，這是最惡劣的壓迫形式。這意味著：“要么按照我的話語說話，要么閉嘴!”這就是為什么“無需對話”的原因。我不認為這是一種批判。恰恰相反，這些抗議是歇斯底里的。

　　正如所有虔誠的弗洛伊德信徒所了解的，歇斯底里是存在的。1968年所犯的重大錯誤之一就是公眾們部分地認為歇斯底里只是一種抱怨，只有變態者才是真正的激進分子，而歇斯底里的人不知道他們想要什么。即使佛洛伊德也認為，變態者做了歇斯底里的人只能夢想去做的事。但福柯是正確的：每一個政體都需要自己的變態形式;變態符合權力關系。歇斯底里才是真正的問題：當你把支配者視為需要解決的問題時，卻沒有明確的答案。你自己不知道“你想要什么”。

　　艾哈邁德：在占領運動中，那些宗派主義的左翼起到了怎樣的作用?正是這些人被看成是“支配者”，這包括國際社會主義組織(ISO)、革命共產黨(RCP)以及其他人，還有宗派主義左翼的殘留分子。

　　齊澤克：我聽說過鮑勃·阿瓦基安(Bob Avakian)的組織，即美國的革命共產黨。但是他們是毛主義者嗎?我和他們爭論過。我幾乎與他們一起成為資產階級自由主義者。我甚至還為阿瓦基安的一本書寫了序。但是，他們所談論的“新綜合”(new synthesis)沒有理論實質，無法實施。他們總是只有答案：沒有問題，只有答案。

　　他們擁有一旦獲得權力將如何行動的宣言。但是當你被是否要協調大量的工人階級行動的問題所困擾時，你還會贏得選舉嗎?對于他們來說，他們會通過某種方式取得政權，接著開始出現問題。我想說，他們是不折不扣的“變態者”。拉康有一個非常好的表述：變態者是他人愿望實現的工具。一個變態者比你更清楚你真正想要的是什么。他們總是擁有答案：不是問題，僅僅是答案。他們只是討厭的人而不是危險分子。他們自稱擁有答案，但完全沒有什么實質內容。

　　我還與他們(更多地是在細節上)爭論過在中國發生的引人注目的一些具體歷史事件，不僅是文化大革命，還有50年代末的“大躍進”。他們的回答是，這些都是“資產階級宣傳”的縮影。現在，一些檔案被公開了，它們證明“大躍進”所發生的一些事情是巨大的悲劇。

　　但是對于左翼來說，至關重要的是我們需要處理好歷史遺產。我不喜歡左翼所持有的態度：“是的，斯大林主義是錯的，但是看看殖民主義的恐怖!”我認為存在著新殖民主義、后殖民主義等問題。

　　但是即使在現在，斯大林主義在20世紀所存在的問題，所有的自由派與保守派所批評的問題，都是由于我們沒有很好地對實際發生的事情給予清算造成的。我們得到的是快速的蓋棺定論。當你追尋哲學的起源時，你會說：“盧梭。”這就是這種做法的直接后果。

　　這里，我要批判《啟蒙辯證法》中的阿多諾和霍克海默。他們是一個極端的例子。他們只關注法西斯主義。雖然有馬爾庫塞的《蘇聯馬克思主義》一書，但你還是會發現，法蘭克福學派幾乎完全忽略了斯大林主義。實際上在他們那里并不存在任何真正的斯大林主義理論。他們思考的是20世紀以操縱事實的最原始邏輯和同一哲學等而發端的極權主義的潛在可能性。我不認為用哲學方法建立起解釋20世紀事件的可能性的先驗模型會真的有用。

　　任務依舊存在。對于20世紀所有令人感到恐怖的事件，自由主義者的解釋是不充分的。這仍然需要左翼付諸努力。

　　艾哈邁德：但這是啟蒙的“辯證法”!導致極權主義的東西也產生了自由的可能性。

　　齊澤克：我知道他們所說的啟蒙需要更多啟蒙的問題。對此，他們非常清楚。我不同意哈貝馬斯(在《現代性的哲學話語》中)對霍克海默和阿多諾的批判，但是我同意他的另一個并不重要的批評，即阿多諾和霍克海默對啟蒙有助于解放的闡發不夠充分。你有一些關于“全然的他者”(wholly other)的神秘構想。在韋爾索(Verso)出版社最近出版的一本小冊子里，記錄了霍克海默與阿多諾自20世紀50年代后期開始的對話，老實說，我感到它過于空洞。

　　我很贊同波斯頓(Moishe Postone)的主張：今天我們需要從各個層面修復的是政治經濟批判。不僅是一種經濟理論，對于馬克思而言，它意味著更多其他的方面。

　　我很想說，這是一種歷史的超驗。馬克思所發展的政治經濟學批判的類型，不是用來分析某些社會領域的類型。它們是更重要的類型。它們組織起社會生活的總體。這是今天需要被修復的地方。但我不同意波斯頓的地方是，在他那里階級劃分似乎變成了無關緊要的事情。他傾向于輕視和消解階級劃分。不，好像商品拜物教是比階級斗爭更為根本的一種總體結構。我認為：在弱化階級斗爭、走向經驗主義的歷史事件這一方向上，他走得太快了。在這里，我更欣賞年輕的盧卡奇，在《歷史與階級意識》中，他的政治經濟批判表現出清晰的非經驗主義和歷史超驗性，與此同時，他又是完全圍繞著階級斗爭來闡述的。

　　我們已不再擁有傳統的工人階級——我同意這一點。今天在這里(艾克學院)，我要即興指出，我們需要構建解放主體的概念，即使我們沒能將其建基在傳統馬克思主義的工人階級之上。你必須將資本主義發展動力之外的所謂“邪惡軸心國家”納入其中，你還必須將失業者納入其中，他們將成為愈加強大的一種類型。這就是任務：真正并明確地提出事業。波斯頓很接近這一點。如果除卻那些冗言，能否說我們已經展示了以及在何種意義上展示了馬克思的勞動價值理論?比如，我想要激怒我的朋友，他認為我應該抨擊查韋斯并捍衛美國，但你決不能盲目地搬用馬克思所謂的勞動價值理論。因為你必須要推斷，比如今天的委內瑞拉正通過石油利益剝削美國。但是馬克思在《資本論》中試圖說明的是：自然資源不是一種價值資源。因此，這意味著我們要重新思考剝削的類型。

　　我想指出的另一點是，馬克思在《大綱》中的那個著名段落中所提及的“一般智力”(general intellect)，就一般的、共有的知識而言，可謂正中要害，但同時這也是馬克思最糟糕的提法。因為馬克思認為，當知識成為決定性的動力、成為產生社會財富的核心時，剝削勞動的資本主義邏輯以及勞動價值理論將變得毫無意義，因為它不再有效。但當馬克思說由于勞動時間不再是價值的源泉因而導致資本主義毫無意義時，他聽起來像是個技術決定論者。馬克思沒有看到的是，你可以擁有“一般智力”，它作為一般的智力被以不正當的方式私有化。因此，你不能只是回到馬克思。由于今天資本主義的全球化，我們必須提出如何重新思考政治經濟批判的問題。這是一個偉大的任務：我還沒有看到任何答案。

　　艾哈邁德：你所說的很多都非常接近《鴨嘴獸評論》的言論。“鴨嘴獸”的主要的口號是：“左翼已死!左翼萬歲!”

　　齊澤克：這非常偉大!這是真正的復興左翼的方式。因為它關涉所有左翼的類型。1968年發生的事情是復興運動的一個模版，它使資本主義有了極大的改善。1968年之后的所有現象都表明了這一點。

　　艾哈邁德：《鴨嘴獸評論》在反戰運動的背景下產生，因此它是對“我的敵人的敵人是我的朋友”這一邏輯的響應，也因此，它支持極右翼的伊斯蘭教主義的伊拉克反叛者脫離反布什主義團體。

　　齊澤克：我們必須克服伊斯蘭恐懼癥。但我完全不同意伊斯蘭原教旨主義有關解放的潛力的思想。問題是為什么自由放縱與原教旨主義兩者之間的對立存在于同一體系中。自由主義產生了既不為伊斯蘭教也不為如美國這樣的基督教原教旨主義所控制的一種原教旨主義。托馬斯·弗蘭克(Thomas Frank)的書《堪薩斯怎么了?》就是圍繞著它來談的，雖然這不是什么嚴肅的理論。從傳統上講，堪薩斯曾經是最激進的州，約翰·布朗(John Brown)就出自那里。堪薩斯這個有著激進的社會需求的堡壘成為基督教原教旨主義的中心。我不認同伊斯蘭教的“正義感”等主張。有些人甚至聲稱，如果你批判神學，那么你就是實實在在的帝國主義者，屬于敵人陣營。我不同意這一點。

　　艾哈邁德：但是很多左翼認同這種邏輯。

　　齊澤克：在這個問題上，我與反殖民主義理論大家薩米爾·阿明(Samir Amin)激烈地爭執過。當我說到每個左翼分子都應該感謝從小布什那里繼承的歷史遺產時，他對我大加指責。我指出，具有諷刺意味的是，布什總統任期最大的成果僅僅在于把美國變成了區域性的超級大國。它現在實際上已逐漸失去真正的霸權，而它過去幾乎就是全球警察。但是，具有諷刺意味的是，也許這種進展并不好。例如剛果就讓美國介入其中。我想說的是，布什愚蠢地加速了所謂的多中心化進程。我們不應該僅僅指出美國如何不好。我們應該采用同樣的標準，例如中國(讓我們忘記西藏這個復雜的問題)在緬甸或非洲的所作所為(與專制統治者進行新殖民主義的開發合作等等)。這就是阿明憤怒的地方。危機無論何時都會存在，我們確實應該批判美國，但它不是永遠的敵人。比如，看看印度及其在克什米爾的所作所為。克什米爾主要的抵抗組織已宣布放棄暴力，并說：“我們會進行政治斗爭”。但印度當局仍然視其為恐怖分子。這就是我要說的。我也不喜歡類似巴甫洛夫式無條件反射的那種馬克思主義，即當人們說到“普遍人權”時的反應：“噢，你在用敵人的語言說話!你在為帝國主義辯護”。我認為這是另一種恐怖。大多數時候是這樣，但并不總是這樣。我知道整個馬克思主義者的游戲規則：“你說的是 ‘普遍’，但你真正所指的是白人、男性”等等。

　　但我們不要忘記，普遍性也許是我們所擁有的尋求解放的最重要工具。我非常懷疑后現代模式。而且，在這里，我和波斯頓、法蘭克福學派以及其他一些人處于同一層面上，我們反對后現代口號，即每一種普遍性都是潛在的“同一性”和極權主義。我對“反抗全球資本主義”與以多元特殊性抵制全球化是殊途同歸的這一點深表懷疑。我認為，圍繞著普遍性這一主題來談是非常重要的。與此同時，我幾年前曾寫過——它給我帶來許多敵人——《多元文化主義，全球資本主義的邏輯》一文。我不同意像霍米·巴巴(Homi Bhabha)那樣的新殖民主義者，他認為，在某種意義上，資本主義是普世化的，它應該消滅差異。不，資本主義是極端的多元文化主義者和文化多元主義者。為什么呢?這是美國右翼民粹主義沒有“正確”回答的問題，但卻是對現實問題的一種回應。他們對社會下層進行操控，其見解基本正確。我的朋友大衛·哈維(David Harvey)也指出，當今的全球資本主義不再將大都市植入第三世界國家。相反，為了更高的利益，人們把自己的國家變成殖民地。這意味著，通過外包等方式，今天美國的資本愿意犧牲美國勞工。如今，資本主義在世界上真的已經很普遍。美國資本不能被視為僅僅是美國的。我不同意我的拉丁美洲朋友關于資本主義的本質是“盎格魯—薩克遜模式”的說法，阿蘭·巴迪烏也是如此強調。資本主義確實已經很普遍，它不根植于任何文化，它也不是以歐洲為中心。持續不斷的危機的影響會最終結束任何一種“歐洲中心主義”。這并不僅僅是一個好的過程。例如， 存在著“擁有亞洲價值觀的資本主義”——也就是說，資本主義比自由主義更有效率，并且不需要民主的存在。

　　艾哈邁德：我們同意這一觀點。例如，鴨嘴獸支部去年夏天成立了閱讀小組(這已經是第二次了)，學習包括盧梭、亞當·斯密、本雅明和其他一些現在出現在自由國家的“激進的資產階級哲學”。

　　齊澤克：是的，我不同意克勞德·勒福爾(Claude Lefort)的觀點，比如，他認為資產階級自由只是形式上的自由。這不是事實。激進的資產階級自由戰士們深知，真正的自由源自社會自由。他們也意識到了社會這個維度，并支持共同組織起這種權利。另一方面，對于作為形式上的民主的這種資產階級民主的批判是完全反馬克思主義的。因為馬克思深知，形式從來就不只是簡單的形式。要開始改變，首先要有“形式”上的改變。例如，當馬克思描述資本主義發展時，首先要有對資本主義條件下生產的“形式吸納”(formal subsumption)。這意味著，生產還是和以前一樣，比如一開始只是在家里編織，接著有商家為了賺錢從他們那里購買。然后，伴隨著這種形式吸納，他們被拉進了工廠。我們應該完全放棄這種形式追隨內容的偏見，即認為首先是新事物不斷發展，然后才獲得一種形式。不是的。

　　艾哈邁德：就在幾年前，在反伊戰運動期間，對左翼來說形成鮮明對比的是反越戰運動。但今天的形勢以及20世紀60年代以來左翼的機會有了怎樣的改變?

　　齊澤克：在這里，我非常同意波斯頓的看法。例如，所有這些反伊戰抗議活動從來沒有試圖與伊拉克的左翼聯系在一起。顯然，“我們應該防止這種情況的再次發生”。例如，伊拉克共產黨加入了美國占領運動后的第一屆政府。對我來說，這場反伊戰抗議活動有著明顯的局限。他們完全忽略了與伊拉克左翼的接觸。通常的說法是，伊拉克人民應該自己解放自己，不需要美國的占領。但是，他們有著同樣的問題，并陷入了一個僵局。伴隨著對“綠區”(Green Zone，指伊拉克戰爭后美英等國在伊拉克首都巴格達使館區附近建立的一個“安全區”。——譯者注)的攻擊的是：你會站在哪一邊?自從伊拉克左翼反對美國占領以來，我還沒有準備好做些什么，他們應該站在抵抗者一邊。我認為這些激進的伊斯蘭主義者不會永遠得到支持。

　　這就是我認為埃及解放廣場的抗議活動具有重要歷史意義的地方。種族主義的西方左翼觀點是，只有通過反猶太主義、宗教原教旨主義或民族主義才能動員阿拉伯人。但在這里，我們有世俗的民主抗議，不是反猶太人的，不是伊斯蘭原教旨主義的，甚至不是民族主義的。沒有人被誘騙到反猶太人的思想陣線上來。他們的陣線是一貫的，這與以色列無關，這是我們的問題，是為了我們所有人的自由。穆巴拉克政權總是說猶太復國主義和猶太人是我們的敵人。不，真正的敵人是埃及軍隊。這具有歷史性的重要意義。

　　對西方勢力而言，支持這些運動將是非常危險的。慢慢地，在軍隊和穆斯林兄弟會之間將會出現分裂。請不要忘記，軍隊是過去穆巴拉克的軍隊，而且充滿著特權和腐敗。但是，目前埃及經濟和埃及民眾的生活水平正在發生嚴重下滑。所以，軍隊仍將維持其特權，而穆斯林兄弟會也將保持其意識形態霸權。這將是決定性的一戰。在這里，穆斯林原教旨主義者可以獲得權力。同時，我很吃驚地看到一些以色列的評論認為，這表明阿拉伯人不會實現民主。只要阿拉伯國家存在極權政權，就會有反猶太主義。唯一的機會是世俗的民主。據說在中國有這樣一個趣談，如果你真的討厭某些人，就對他們說：“愿你生活在趣味橫生的時代。”但是我在中國的時候問中國人，他們都說不知道這個說法，只有在西方世界才說這是中國人的說法。

　　艾哈邁德：那么資本主義又怎么樣呢?你在最近的一部著作《生在末世》(2010)中援引了波斯頓對馬克思的解讀，波斯頓以新的方式提出了商品形式問題和主體性的問題。在反思馬克思方面適合于當今發展現狀的地方在哪里?要克服勞動的商品形式，需要哪一方面來擔當?是政治嗎?

　　齊澤克：這就是他們所說的電視智力競賽節目中的那個獎金為100萬美元的問題。我沒有答案。但是，如果你看看像生態這樣的關鍵問題，就會很清楚，按照福山的文章中有關自由民主的資本主義是歷史的終結的說法，這是無法解決的問題。但是，我不相信一些地區性自組織社區的烏托邦。我們——夸張些說，人類——將需要大量的大規模聯合機構的力量，以推動千百萬人。

　　艾哈邁德：這如何體現勞動的商品形式?

　　齊澤克：我要說的是需要建立一些大型的官方機構。這是當今復雜世界中唯一的解決方法。當然，問題是如何建立起來。超過一定的數量規模，傳統意義上的民主將無法有效運轉。“讓我們擁有普遍選舉”這樣的說法毫無意義。50億人投票?那就會像《星球大戰》和“銀河共和國”一樣。

　　要知道，艾茵·蘭德(Ayn Rand)是正確的：金錢是實現自由的最強有力的手段或工具。她的意思是：只有雙方都想要它，我們才發生交換。至少在形式上，交換雙方都有所得。沒有金錢，就需要恢復直接的統治手段。當然，我不接受她的前提：要么是金錢規則，要么是直接統治。盡管如此，難道沒有一個恰當的點嗎?人們可以批判作為一種異化形式的金錢，但我們如何才能在金錢之外、在不需要直接統治的情況下真正組織起多元的社會合作?換句話說，20世紀斯大林主義的悲劇不是恰恰在于他們試圖終止市場而不是金錢嗎?而結果又是什么呢?是重新開始直接統治。

　　我不是一個樂觀的人。我認為我們現在的情況極其危險。我認為我們正在走向一個更加專制的全球種族隔離社會。傳統上，對馬克思而言，理想的剝削形式是通過形式上的合法自由來實現的。在理想的資本主義社會中，擁有平等的、自由的交換。但是，資本主義越來越無法再維系這一點。它不再提供自由和平等。按照吉奧喬·阿甘本(Giorgio Agamben)的理解，有些人將成為“牲人”(homo sacer，意大利著名哲學家阿甘本用“牲人”一詞表示那些被剝奪了社會聯系與政治資格的人。——譯者注)。新形式的種族隔離正在出現。邁克·戴維斯(Mike Davis)的《布滿貧民窟的星球》描寫得雖然有些天真，但是卻表達了這樣一種觀點：我們被控制著，但在國家的控制之外還有著大量的人口。按照戴維斯的說法，有超過10億人生活在貧民窟。我的意思不只是指貧窮。政府機構已經開始處理國內這些被遺忘的荒蠻地區的問題。從政治上來說，這些廣闊的地區似乎仍然陰暗混亂。在這里，我注意到一個巨大的問題：我對未來的看法是什么?這是否可以繼續下去?特里·吉列姆(Terry Gilliam)半喜劇化的影片《巴西》表明了這一點：它是半極權主義，但也是享樂主義。一個十足的極權主義政權，卻有著私人享樂的性質。貝盧斯科尼很接近這一點，他是掌握權力的格勞喬·馬克斯(Groucho Marx)。沒有人關心你在私生活方面是否不正常，只要不危及政治。這里不再有典型的法西斯式的動員。

　　例如，反移民不是法西斯主義。法西斯主義并沒有卷土重來。不，這不是概念上的思考，而是模糊的聯想。這是后意識形態。傳統的法西斯主義是極端的意識形態。今天的主導意識形態是“認識你自己”這種西方的佛教資本主義。它允許政治極權主義存在私人享樂。

　　艾哈邁德：今日的馬克思主義與歷史的關聯性是什么?我們可以從歷史人物那里學到什么，比如可以從列寧關于改變世界的思想那里學到什么?馬克思主義沒有失敗嗎?我們如何避免重復那種失敗?或者，如您之前把列寧與貝克特(Samuel Beckett，“再次嘗試，再次失敗，在失敗中進步”是其名言。——譯者注)聯系在一起時所指出的，歸根結底，問題的關鍵是“再次失敗”和“在失敗中進步”嗎?那么在這一點上，你對“成功”的預測是什么?

　　齊澤克：我完全同意你的看法。我已經成為貝克特陣線的自我批評者。“再次失敗，而且在失敗中進步。”能取得勝利是好事!我越來越厭倦了“讓我們共同面對一切”這種說法，但后來事情恢復了正常。我感興趣的是隨之而來的事情。我們的日常生活是如何被影響的?對我來說，真正的革命就在于此。辛苦的工作和日常生活的樂趣是如何受到影響的?

　　如果從“回到列寧”這種意義上來說，我其實不是一個列寧主義者。我喜歡的是列寧完全不受傳統束縛的精神和他愿意重審局勢的做法。他不被教條所約束。同時，他不害怕行動。我認為很多左翼人士偷偷地享受著他們所反對的角色，并且害怕站出來。我不同意巴迪烏和其他一些人關于“政治離政府一定距離而生”的說法。我們依然把政府看作是社會管理的形式。

　　以希臘為例，它已接近分崩離析。左翼分子駐足于政府政治之外，他們不是要進行一場革命，而是有選擇性地向政府施壓并支持現有黨派。這意味著我們尚未做好準備。

　　我認為，在列寧時代，蘇聯最大的失敗恰恰是在內戰之后。當一切都恢復正常之時，那曾經是一個美好的時代。布爾什維克面臨著改革日常生活的挑戰，結果他們失敗了。所以，我們有滿腔熱情去取得勝利，但后來卻遭受失敗。最偉大馬克思主義者是那些撰文分析失敗原因的人。

　　今天的艱巨任務是避免這種情況，即拉康用一個漂亮的辭藻所說的：“對注定要失敗的事業的自戀”。要知道，“我們輸了，但我們輸得很精彩”。你醉心于自己的失敗，而更糟的是，你把失敗當成了一種真實性的標志。“我們失敗了，因為生活是殘酷的，但看看它是多么的美妙啊。”諸如此類的話。這同樣適用于1968年的革命：我們應該找到一條馬克思主義或共產主義革命的道路，它無需經歷資本主義所經歷的那些曲折發展階段。這是20世紀給我們的教訓。這種教訓是消極的：我們學會了不該做什么。這非常重要。也許我錯了，但我沒有看到正面的經驗。我是一個悲觀主義者。

　　但是，如果我們什么都不做的話，那將是一個更大的、徹底的災難。真正的烏托邦是事物按照自己的樣子不確定地發展下去。 2008年的危機看似是監管缺失和個人腐敗造成的。其實這場危機不同于以往。今天，我們正瀕于危險的時代。我們也不可能再依靠任何傳統的方式。左翼的傳統總是有一種趨勢：當它掌握政權時，立刻就轉變為殘酷的統治。如何才能打破在左與右之間的選擇上(如斯大林所說)“兩者都更糟”的僵局?

　　曼德拉非常偉大，但他還是被國際貨幣基金組織誘騙了。我同意這一點，但條件是，怎樣進行選擇?以津巴布韋的慘敗而告終嗎?這才是這里的真正僵局。

　　曼德拉不是叛徒。即使在委內瑞拉的問題上，我還是持悲觀態度：查韋斯正在失去動力。這是一個真正的悲劇。由于玩弄民粹主義的把戲，他忽略了物質基礎設施建設。開采石油的機器開始散架，開采的石油被迫減少。查韋斯開始將受排斥者政治化并煽動他們，但后來他陷入了傳統民粹主義的陷阱。石油收入對查韋斯來說是一個禍根，因為它打開了回避問題的操作空間。但現在，他必須面對這些問題。他有足夠的金錢去緩解問題，但不能解決問題。例如，委內瑞拉有很多的人才外流到哥倫比亞，從長遠來看，這是一場災難。我不信任“玻利瓦爾主義”等等所有這些傳統，這些都是無稽之談。

　　艾哈邁德：我對你所說的有機會重新建構完整的生活的說法很感興趣。對于列寧，這是什么時候的事情?

　　齊澤克：大概是在新經濟政策前后。令人感興趣的是產生了什么后果。最悲觀的解讀是：斯大林政權形成了。這種解讀的邏輯是，我們從經濟中撤出，但不是為放棄權力，而是會加強政權。在羅斯福新政那幾年，政府的官僚機構一下子擴大了。早在1923年，斯大林提名了10萬名中級干部。托洛茨基愚蠢地加入了這場傲慢的游戲，并且沒有注意到這一點。他認為是自己創建了紅軍，覺得自己有號召力。但是，據季米特洛夫的日記記載，斯大林認為托洛茨基在20世紀20年代早期更受歡迎，但斯大林控制了干部，并因此勝出。如果托洛茨基勝出，誰知道會發生什么事情呢?情況或許會不一樣，誰又能說得清楚呢?我喜歡托洛茨基的是，像列寧一樣，他是一個現實主義者。也許在資產階級革命期間可以做得最出色。列寧一直為結束內戰殫盡竭慮，殘酷的現實是，經過內戰的屠殺之后，能夠組織起來的工人階級便難尋蹤跡了。

　　[譯者：杜敏：云南大學馬克思主義研究院;李泉：昆明學院思想政治理論課教學科研部]

　　The Occupy movement, a renascent Left, and Marxism today: An interview with Slavoj ?i?ek

　　December 1st, 2011

　　Haseeb Ahmed with Chris Cutrone

　　Platypus Review 42 | December 2011 – January 2012

　　On November 5, 2011, using questions formulated together with Chris Cutrone, Haseeb Ahmed interviewed Slavoj ?i?ek at the Jan van Eyck Academie in Maastricht, the Netherlands. The following is an edited transcript of their conversation.

　　Haseeb Ahmed: Are we currently—after Tahrir Square and the eruption of the Occupy movement—living through a renaissance of the Left? If so, what is the historical legacy that stands in need of reconsideration?

　　Slavoj ?i?ek: I would say my answer is very cautious. Conditionally: Yes. That is to say, the way I read all these events, totally spontaneous as they are, is that, although people try, for example, to read the Tahrir Square events as the simple demand for democracy, nonetheless there is a deeper systemic dissatisfaction. What I see as a hopeful sign is that these are no longer simple, one-issue protests against this or that. There is some vague awareness that there is another fault in the system as such. By this I mean precisely the capitalist system. And, point two, that the standard representative multi-party political democracy is not a form through which we can deal with the problems. The problem today is that we have a lot of “anti-capitalism,” indeed an overload of anti-capitalism, but it is an ethical anti-capitalism. In the media, everywhere one finds stories about how this company is exploiting people someplace and ruining the environment, or this bank is ruining hardworking people’s funds. All of these are moralistic critiques of distortions. This is not enough. The anti-capitalism of the popular media remains at the level of something to be resolved within the established structure: through investigative journalism, democratic reforms, and the like. But I see in all of this the vague instinct that something more is at stake. The battle now, as for the capitalists themselves, is over who will appropriate it.

　　Events happen, and then you have the crucial battle to decide what an event means. I think that precisely these events, like Occupy Wall Street, are crucial because, on the one hand, they demonstrate that the problem is capitalism as such. This was the big issue in the 20th century, but somehow disappeared in the last decades from the traditional left, where the focus became specific issues such as racism and sexism. But this problem is still here. At the same time, I claim that nonetheless old answers no longer work. This is why, what critics and sympathizers notice, there is a lack of concrete proposals, what to do. Apart from abstract things, like with Spain’s Indignados, against people serving money instead of money serving people. But every fascist would subscribe to this.

　　What it reminds us is the fact that, as my friend Alain Badiou puts it, the 20th century is over. Not only state socialism and the social-democratic welfare state, but also, I would add, the deepest hope of the utopian left, “horizontal organization,” local communities, direct democracy, self-organization—all this, I don’t think it works. So, again, it is a big challenge. The old problem is back, but it is clearer than ever that the old answers are not up to the challenge. It is a great challenge. If you look at predominant ways the modest liberal left is conceptualizing problems, for instance, in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, you can see that all this doesn’t work to recuperate this negative energy.

　　What surprises me is that there is so much energy. I thought that maybe it would stop. But look at how it is exploding all around the United States. Even Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans join them. This is the big news. There is an incredibly serious, great degree of rage and dissatisfaction that clearly doesn’t fit the established channels to resolve problems within the traditional scope of economic protests. It’s a wonderful, crucial moment. It’s a negative gesture. My slogan is, “No dialogue!” at this point. Let’s not get caught into this dialectic of dialogue with the enemy. No. It is too early. Not in the sense of, “We won’t talk, we’ll just kill you.” But, rather, if we talk now, we have to use some language, but this will be the language of the enemy. We need time to construct our own new language, time to formulate.

　　Protesters in Tahrir Square.

　　HA:Still the language of the Left?

　　S?: Either orthodox left or the American language of the pragmatic left: Is it “trade unions,” is it “pressure groups,” etc.? All of this is not enough. I think the strength is what the hegemonic bourgeois press identifies as the weakness of the protests. “Isn’t this a hysterical protest? What do these guys really want?” That’s what is great about it. It doesn’t fit. You can’t simply say, “Let’s do democratic protest,” whatever. There is the approach of, “Tell us, what do you want?” “Translate it into concrete demands.” But also—and I know it’s marginal—there are the elements of this old hippie carnival logic. Someone told me there was this guy in San Francisco who said, “What program? We’re here to have a good time!” These are all traps. But, nonetheless, it is nice that something new happens which doesn’t yet have form. You have to begin like this. In contrast to people who say that before you protest you must know what you want. No. If you put it in this way, “You are just hysterical,” you are in the logic of the way a master addresses a man. It is as a master asking a hysterical woman, “Tell me what you want!” No, this is the worst form of oppression. This means, “Speak my language or shut up!” That’s why: “No debate!” I don’t see this as a criticism. On the contrary. These protests are hysterical.

　　But as all good Freudians know, hysteria is the authentic thing. One of the big mistakes in 1968 was to partially accept in the mass ideology the presupposition that hysterics just complain, but perverts are the real radicals: Hysterics don’t know what they want. Even Freud says somewhere that perverts do what hysterics only dream about doing. But Foucault was right: Every power regime needs its own form of perversion; perversion fits power relations. Hysteria is the true question: when you problematize the master, but without clear answers. You yourself do not know, “What do you want?”

　　HA: What about the role the sectarian left would have in the Occupy movement? These are perceived precisely as “the masters”: the ISO, the RCP, et al., the leftovers from the sectarian left.

　　S?: I know of the group of Bob Avakian, the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA. But are they authentically Maoists? I’ve argued with them. I almost become a bourgeois liberal with them. I even wrote a short introduction to one of Avakian’s books.[1] But, for all their talk of the “new synthesis,” there is no theoretical substance: It doesn’t do the work. They always have the answers: no questions, only answers. They have a manifesto for exactly what they will do when they take power. But when you press them with the questions of, will there be a mass working class movement that you will coordinate, will you win elections, what? For them, somehow they take power, and then they have a problem. They are precisely the “perverts,” I would say. Lacan has a good formulation: The pervert is the instrument of the other’s desire. A pervert is the one who knows better than you what you really want. They always have the answers: never the questions, only the answers. They are not a danger but an annoyance. They pretend to have the answers, but totally without anything substantial. Also, more in detail, they’ve disputed with me concrete historical, dramatic events in China, not only the Cultural Revolution, but also, in the late 1950s: the Great Leap Forward. Their answer is that these are merely the portrayals of “bourgeois propaganda.” Now, some archives are opened, and they do demonstrate that it was a mega-tragedy, the Great Leap Forward, what happened there. But, crucially, for the Left, we need to deal with our heritage. I don’t like the Left that has the attitude that, “Yes, Stalinism was bad. But look at the horrors of colonialism!” Yes, I agree there are the problems of neo-colonialism, post-colonialism, etc. But the problem with the Stalinist 20thcentury, even now, with all the liberal and conservative critiques, is that we don’t have a good account of what really happened. What we get is quick generalizations. You look for philosophical origins. You say, “Rousseau. This is a direct consequence of such an approach.”

　　Here I am very critical of Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment. They are an extreme example. They address fascism. Look, I’ve done my homework. But you will notice that the Frankfurt School almost totally ignores Stalinism—despite Marcuse’s Soviet Marxism. But there is no true theory of Stalinism. They think that the totalitarian potentials that exploded in the 20th century started already with the most primitive logic of manipulation of matter, the philosophy of identity, etc. I don’t think that this really works, the philosophical approach to establishing some transcendental matrix that explains the possibility for 20th century events. The task is still ahead. With all the horrors of the 20th century, the liberals’ account is insufficient. It remains for the Left to explain this.

　　HA: But it is a dialectic of Enlightenment! What gives rise to totalitarianism is also what gives rise to possibilities for freedom.

　　S?: I know that they say that the problem of Enlightenment demands more enlightenment. They are very clear about this. I don’t agree with Habermas’s critique of Horkheimer and Adorno [in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity]. But maybe he has a minor point. The emancipatory aspect of Enlightenment is much less explicated by Adorno and Horkheimer. You get some mystical formulations, about the “wholly other.” In the recently published small book by Verso, the dialogues between Horkheimer and Adorno from the late 1950s, what strikes me, to be blunt, is how empty this was.

　　I appreciate [Moishe] Postone claiming that what we need to rehabilitate today, at all levels, is the critique of political economy. Not only as an economic theory, but also, with Marx, it is much more. I am tempted to say that it is rather a historical transcendental a priori. The categories that Marx uses in his deployment of the critique of political economy are not just categories to analyze a certain sphere of society. They are stronger categories. They organize the totality of social life. This is what needs to be rehabilitated today. But where I don’t agree with Postone is that, sometimes, he sounds as if the class division somehow becomes secondary and gets lost. No. As if commodity fetishism is a kind of general structure more fundamental than class struggle. I think he sometimes goes too quickly in this direction of reducing class struggle just to a certain empirical historical occurrence. Here, I appreciate much more the young Lukács, in History and Class Consciousness, who is very clear about this non-empirical, historical a priori for the critique of political economy, but at the same time speaks totally to class struggle.

　　Even if we no longer have the old working class—I agree here. In the sense of what I was improvising here [at the Jan van Eyck Academie] today, that we need to conceptualize the emancipatory subject, even if we cannot ground it in the old Marxist working class. You must include the so-called “rogue states,” outside the capitalist dynamic. You must include unemployment, which is becoming a much stronger category. This is the task: how to truly render things, apparently. Postone approaches this. If we cut the bullshit, can we speak of, and in what sense, Marx’s labor theory of value? For instance, I like to provoke my friends, who think I am attacking Chavez and defending the United States. But you cannot mechanically apply Marx’s so-called labor theory of value. Because you have to conclude, for instance, today, that Venezuela is exploiting the United States through oil profits. But Marx tries to demonstrate in Capital that natural resources are not a source of value. So this means that we need to rethink the category of exploitation.

　　Another point that I make is that when Marx, in the famous passage of the Grundrisse, speaks about the “general intellect,” in the sense of general, common knowledge, this is Marx at his best, but also, at the same time, his worst. Because Marx thought that when knowledge becomes the center of agency, of generating social wealth, then the capitalist logic of exploiting labor, following the labor theory of value, becomes meaningless, because it no longer works. But Marx here sounds like some kind of a technological determinist, when he says that capitalism becomes meaningless, because the time of labor is no longer the source of value. What Marx doesn’t see is that you can have this “general intellect,” which, as a general intellect, is then, in a perverse way, privatized. So you can’t just return to Marx. In view of today’s global capitalism, we must ask the question of how to rethink the critique of political economy. This is a great task: I don’t see any answers.

　　HA: A lot of what you say is very close to what Platypus has to say. Platypus’s main slogan is “The Left is dead!—Long live the Left!”

　　S?: This is great! This is the only way to truly resuscitate the Left. Because it refers to all varieties of the Left. 1968 is a model for how the movement recuperated and gave an incredible new boost to capitalism. All the post-1968 phenomena show this.

　　HA: Platypus emerged in the context of the anti-war movement. So, it emerged in response to the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and thus the support for far-right Islamist Iraqi insurgent groups out of anti-Bush-ism.

　　S?: I know we must avoid Islamophobia. But I reject totally the idea of Islamic fundamentalism’s emancipatory potential. The question is why the contrast between liberal permissiveness and fundamentalism is totally immanent to the system. Liberalism generates such fundamentalism, which is not restricted to Islamism, but also Christian fundamentalism in the U.S., for instance. While it is not serious theory, Thomas Frank’s book What’s the Matter with Kansas? speaks to this. Kansas was once, traditionally, the most radical state—John Brown was from there. This bastion of radical social demands became the center of Christian fundamentalism. I don’t buy claims about Islam’s “sense of justice,” etc. Some people go so far as to claim that if you critique theology then you are imperialist, practically, and in the camp of the enemy. I don’t buy this.

　　HA: But much of the Left buys into this logic.

　　S?: I got into a shouting match with the big anti-colonialist theorist Samir Amin over this. He shouted at me when I said that there is a historical legacy that every leftist should be thankful for in Bush, the second President. I pointed out, ironically, that, let’s cut the crap, the biggest result of the Bush presidency is that the U.S. is becoming merely a local superpower. They are effectively gradually losing true hegemony. They were close to becoming a universal policeman. But, ironically, or cynically speaking, perhaps this development is not good. Take the Congo: Let the U.S. intervene there. What I am saying is that Bush’s stupidity accelerated so-called multi-centricity. We should not merely point out how bad the U.S. is. But we should apply the same standards, for example, to China—let’s forget about Tibet, a complex problem—with what they are doing in Myanmar or Africa: neocolonialist exploitation collaborating with tyrants, etc. This is where Amin exploded. Whenever there is a crisis, we should be critical of the U.S., but my God, they are not always the enemy. Look at India and what they’re doing in Kashmir, for example. The main resistance group in Kashmir formally renounced violence and said, “We will do the political struggle,” but the Indian establishment still treats them as terrorists. That’s all I’m saying. I also don’t like—another horror I will tell you—the kind of Marxism that has an automatic Pavlovian response, when one speaks of “universal human rights”: “Oh, you’re speaking the language of the enemy! You’re apologizing for imperialism.” Most of the time, yes, but not all of the time. I know this whole Marxist game, “You say ‘universal,’ but you really mean white, male,” etc.

　　But let’s not forget that universality is nonetheless maybe the most important tool of emancipation we have. I am deeply suspicious of postmodern models. And, here, we should be at the same level with Postone and the Frankfurt School and some others, against postmodernism’s mantra that every universality is potentially “identitarian” and totalitarian. I am very suspicious of “resistance to global capitalism” along the lines of multiple particularities resisting globalization, etc. I think it is important to speak to universality. At the same time, I wrote previously, years ago—which brought me many enemies—of “multiculturalism, the logic of global capitalism.”[2]I don’t agree with those neo-colonialists like Homi Bhabha, who said, at some point, that capitalism is universalizing and wanting to erase difference. No. Capitalism is infinitely multiculturalist and culturally pluralist. Why? This is what American right-wing populism is, not “correct” about, but is a response to a real problem. They’ve got the lower classes manipulated with their basically correct insight that, in today’s global capitalism, as my friend David Harvey also points out, there is no longer the metropolis screwing the Third World countries. Rather, for higher profits, one turns one’s own country into a colony. What this means is that, through outsourcing, etc., today’s American capital is willing to sacrifice American workers. Capitalism is really universal today. American capital cannot be considered that of the U.S. I don’t agree with my Latin American friends who say that capitalism is inherently “Anglo-Saxon,” etc. Alain Badiou emphasizes this. Capitalism is truly universal. It is not rooted in any culture. It is not Eurocentric. The effect of the ongoing crisis will be the definitive end of any such “Eurocentrism.” This is not simply a good process. For instance, there is “capitalism with Asian values”—that is, capitalism more productive than liberalism and without democracy.

　　HA: We in Platypus would agree with this. For example, Platypus held a reading group last summer, for the second time, on “radical bourgeois philosophy,” including Rousseau, Adam Smith, Benjamin Constant, and others, on the emergence of the modern notion of freedom.

　　S?:Yes. I don’t agree with Claude Lefort, for example, that bourgeois freedom is only formal freedom. No, it’s not true. Radical bourgeois freedom fighters were well aware that freedom comes only insofar as it is truly social freedom. They were well aware of the social dimension, and upheld the right to organize collectively, etc. On the other hand, this critique of formal democracy as bourgeois democracy is deeply anti-Marxist. As Marx was deeply aware, form is never simply form. To begin a break, one must have first a “formal” break. For instance, when Marx wrote of the development of capitalism, first there was “formal subsumption” of production under capitalism. This means that the production was the same as before, for instance knitting at home, only, then there was the merchant who was buying from them for money. Following this formal subsumption, however, they were drawn into the factories. We should totally drop this prejudice that form follows content, that, first, something new develops, and then it acquires a form. No.

　　HA: Just a few years ago, during the Iraq anti-war movement, the salient comparison for the Left was the Vietnam anti-war movement. But how has the situation today and opportunities for the Left changed (for the better) from the 1960s?

　　S?:Here I agree with Postone, very much. For example, with all these Iraq anti-war protests, there was never any attempt to link with the Left in Iraq. It was purely, “We should prevent this from happening,” etc. For example, in the first government after the U.S. occupation, the Iraqi Communist Party took part. This was for me the clear limitation of the anti-war Iraq protests. They totally neglected contact with the Iraqi left. The standard narrative was that the Iraqi people should liberate themselves, without the U.S. occupation. But they had the same problem, and got into a deadlock. With attacks on the Green Zone: which side should you take, there? I was not ready to do what some did, to claim that, since they opposed the American occupation, they should side with the resistance. I don’t think these radical Islamists should ever be supported.

　　This is where I see the historical significance of the Tahrir Square protests. The racist Western left’s view was that the only way you can mobilize the stupid Arabs was through anti-Semitism, religious fundamentalism, or nationalism. But here we had secular democratic protest that was not anti-Semitic, not Islamic fundamentalist, or even nationalist. No one was duped into an anti-Semitic line of thought. Their line was always that this has nothing to do with Israel, this is our problem, for the freedom of us all. The Mubarak regime was always saying that Zionism and the Jews were our enemy. No, this is the true enemy, the Egyptian military. This is the historical significance.

　　For the Western powers, in supporting the movement, will contribute to something very dangerous. Slowly, there is a schism developing between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. Let’s not forget that the army is the old Mubarak army, with its privileges and corruption, etc. But in the Egyptian economy now there is a serious drop in the standard of living. So, the army will retain its privileges but the Muslim Brotherhood will hold ideological hegemony. This will be the crucial battle. In this, the Muslim fundamentalists can gain power. At the same time, I was shocked to see some Israeli commentary that this shows that Arabs can’t achieve democracy. As long as there are totalitarian regimes in Arab countries, there will be anti-Semitism. The only chance is secular democracy. There’s this joke, in China, allegedly, if you really hate someone, tell them, “May you live in interesting times.” But when I was in China, I asked them, and they said they knew nothing of this saying, only that in the West they say it is a Chinese expression!

　　HA: What about capitalism? In your recent book, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010), you invoke Moishe Postone’s reading of Marx to raise the question of the commodity form and subjectivity in new ways. Where does such reconsideration of Marx fit into the present developing situation? What would overcoming the commodity form of labor entail, politically?

　　S?: This is what they call, on TV quiz shows, the one million dollar question. I don’t have an answer; I’m very modest. But, if you look at critical issues such as ecology it is clear that this will not be able to be addressed according to what we call the Fukuyama thesis of liberal democratic capitalism as the end of history. But I don’t believe in some local self-organized community utopia. We—in the bombastic sense, humanity—will need the massive large-scale power of corporations, to move millions of people.

　　HA:How does this point to the commodity form of labor?

　　S?:All I’m saying is that some large-scale authority will need to be established. It is the only solution in today’s complex world. The problem, of course, is how to do it. Beyond a certain quantitative scope, democracy in the traditional sense no longer works. It’s meaningless to say, “Let’s have universal elections.” Five billion people vote? It will be like Star Wars and the Galactic Republic.

　　You know, Ayn Rand was right: Money is the strongest means or instrument for freedom. She means this: We exchange only if both parties want it. At least formally, both sides of the exchange get something. Without money, direct means of domination will need to be restored. Of course, I don’t accept her premise: either the rule of money, or direct domination. Nonetheless, isn’t there a correct point? One can criticize money as an alienated form. But how can we actually organize complex social interaction outside money without direct domination? In other words, isn’t the tragedy of 20th century Stalinism that precisely they tried to suspend, not money, but the market, and what was the result? The re-assertion of brutal direct domination.

　　I’m not an optimist. I think where we are now is extremely dangerous. I think we are moving towards a much more authoritarian global apartheid society. Traditionally, for Marx, the ideal form of exploitation was through formal legal freedom. In ideal capitalist conditions there is equal, free exchange. But, more and more, capitalism can no longer sustain this. It can no longer afford freedom and equality. In the Giorgio Agamben way, some will become homo sacer. New forms of apartheid are appearing. Mike Davis’s Planet of Slums, while really naïve, has the idea that we are controlled, but there are larger and larger populations outside the control of the state: according to Davis, over one billion people already live in slums. I don’t mean only poverty. The state authority already treats these as internal zones that are left wild, wild spaces. Politically, it is as if wide spaces remain really murky. I see a tremendous problem here. What is my idea of the future? Can this go on? Terry Gilliam’sBrazil, which is half-comedy, shows this: it is half-totalitarianism, but also hedonism. A totalitarian regime, but with private pleasure. Berlusconi comes close to this: Groucho Marx in power. Also, in China, at the level of private life, no one cares about your private perversions, but just don’t mess with politics. It is no longer the typical fascist mobilization.

　　Anti-immigration, for instance, is not fascism. Fascism is not returning. No. This isn’t thinking in concepts but rather vague associations. This is post-ideology. Traditional fascism was ultra-ideology. Today’s predominant ideology is a Western Buddhist capitalism of, “Realize who you are.” It is permissive private hedonism with political totalitarianism.

　　HA: What is the relevance of the history of Marxism today? What can we learn from historical figures such as, for example, Lenin, about changing the world? Didn’t Marxism fail? How do we avoid repeating that failure? Or, as you’ve put it previously [in “How to Begin from the Beginning,” New Left Review 57 (May-June 2009)],[3] linking Lenin to Beckett, is the point, after all, to “fail again” and to “fail better?” What is your prognosis for “success,” then, in this regard?

　　S?: I totally agree with you. I have become self-critical of this Beckett line, “Fail again, but fail better.” It would be nice to have some victories! I am getting tired of, “We are all in this together,” but then things go back to normal. What interests me is what comes after. How is our daily life affected? The true revolution for me is there. The hard work and pleasures of daily life, how are they affected?

　　I am not a Leninist in the sense of, “Let’s return to Lenin.” What I like in Lenin is that he was totally unorthodox and was willing to rethink the situation. He didn’t stick to some dogma. At the same time, he wasn’t afraid to act. I claim that quite many leftists secretly enjoy their role of opposition and are afraid to intervene. I disagree with Badiou and some others about how “politics is made at some distance from the state.” Still, we have the state as a regulatory form in society.

　　Take Greece. The state is almost falling apart. So the Left will remain outside state politics, not in the sense of making a revolution, but rather selectively putting pressure on and supporting existing parties. What this means is that we are not ready.

　　For me, the greatest failure of the Soviet Union in Lenin’s time was right after the Civil War. When things returned to normal, it was a beautiful time. The Bolsheviks were challenged to reform everyday life. There, they failed. So, we have these enthusiastic victories, but afterwards failure. The greatest Marxists are those who write books on the analysis of failure.

　　The big task today is to avoid this, what Lacan called, with a beautiful term, the “narcissism of the lost cause.”[4]You know, “We lost, but how beautifully we lost.” You fall in love with your own defeat, and, even worse, make of defeat a sign of authenticity. “We lost because life is cruel, but look at how beautiful it was,” etc. No. The same holds for ’68: We should find a way for Marxism or communist revolution to be something other than a detour between one and another stage of capitalism. This is the lesson of the 20th century. The lessons are only negative: We learn what not to do. This is very important. Maybe I’m wrong, but I don’t see positive lessons. I am an honest pessimist.

　　But, if we do nothing, it will be even a greater radical catastrophe. The true utopia is that things can go on indefinitely as they are. The crisis of 2008 made it seem like it was merely a lack of regulation and corrupted individuals. No, the crisis is different. Today we are approaching dangerous times. We cannot rely on any tradition. Left tradition has a tendency, when it takes power, to turn into brutal domination. How to break this deadlock between two sides that are, as Stalin would have put it, “both worse.”

　　Mandela was great, but he was seduced by the IMF. I agree, but with the great proviso: What was the choice? End up in a Zimbabwe fiasco? This is the real deadlock, here. Mandela was not a traitor. Even with Venezuela, I am a pessimist: Chavez is losing steam. It is a real tragedy. Because of playing these populist games, he neglected physical infrastructure. The machinery of oil extraction is falling apart, and they are compelled to pump less and less. Chavez started well to politicize and mobilize the excluded, but then he fell into the traditional populist trap. Oil money is a curse for Chavez, because it opened maneuvering space to not confront problems. But now he must confront them. He had enough money to patch things up without solving problems. For instance, Venezuela has a great brain drain to Colombia: in the long term, a catastrophe. I am distrustful of all these traditions, “Bolivarianism,” etc.—all bullshit.

　　HA: I am interested in what you said about the opportunity to reformulate the whole of life. With Lenin, when was this?

　　S?: Around the time of the New Economic Policy. It’s interesting what happened. The most pessimistic reading is that the Stalinist state emerged then. The logic was that we will withdraw from the economy but, in order not to lose power, we will strengthen the state. It was in the NEP years that there was an explosion of the state bureaucracy, the apparatus. In 1923 already, Stalin nominated 100,000 mid-level cadre. Trotsky was stupid, playing arrogant games, and didn’t notice this. He thought that he had created the Red Army and had popular appeal. But, in the diaries of Dmitrov, Stalin said that Trotsky was much more popular in the early 1920s, but Stalin controlled the cadre and so won out. If Trotsky had won, who knows what would have happened? It would have been something different, but who knows what? What I like about Trotsky was that, like Lenin, he was a brutal realist. Perhaps the best that could be done was in terms of the bourgeois revolution.[5] Lenin was totally honest about the end of the Civil War, the madness of the situation, there being no organized working class after being slaughtered in the Civil War. |P

　　1. Bob Avakian and Bill Martin, Marxism and the Call of the Future: Conversations on Ethics, History, Politics(Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 2005).

　　2. See “Multiculturalism or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” available online at <http://libcom.org/library/multicultur ... national-capitalism-zizek>.

　　3. Available online at <http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2779>.

　　4. See, however, ?i?ek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008).

　　5. See Lars T. Lih, “October 1921: Lenin Looks Back,” Platypus Review 37 (July 2011), available online at <http://platypus1917.org/2011/07/01/october-1921-lenin-looks-back/>.

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