維基泄密：南方報(bào)業(yè)高管向美國情報(bào)人員傳遞情報(bào)

維基泄密的一則消息顯示，南方報(bào)業(yè)的高管向美國情報(bào)手機(jī)人員傳遞情報(bào)，但維基在披露之后，對(duì)該人員的姓名做了匿名處理。這個(gè)消息說明，南方系和美國政府的關(guān)系已經(jīng)完全是上下級(jí)的走狗關(guān)系，性質(zhì)也已經(jīng)完全是泄露國家機(jī)密或從事間諜犯罪了。可能除了中國，沒有其他國家會(huì)對(duì)這樣出賣國家利益的行為進(jìn)行容忍的。

在這份電報(bào)里，美國駐華大使提到了“關(guān)系”（contacts）之一就是南方報(bào)業(yè)的高管，因?yàn)槲闹刑岬健傲钊梭@訝的是，甚至XXX都沒有讀過他的集團(tuán)里的報(bào)紙發(fā)表的這兩篇文章”。這個(gè)XXX究竟是誰？身居黨報(bào)高位，卻干出這種出賣國家利益泄露國家重要信息的賣過行為，為什么還是通過維基曝光了才知道？為什么這種嚴(yán)重的間諜行為一點(diǎn)反應(yīng)都沒有？

該電文發(fā)于2008年4月16日，，由美國駐華大使Clark T. Randt簽署發(fā)出。內(nèi)容如下：

1. 胡錦濤跟整個(gè)中共領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層一起，繼續(xù)執(zhí)行對(duì)西藏問題的強(qiáng)硬路線。盡管中共領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)西藏問題的看法可能有些差異，但沒有本質(zhì)上的區(qū)別。中共受到西方"持偏見" 的媒體報(bào)導(dǎo)和對(duì)奧運(yùn)相關(guān)的抗議活動(dòng)激起的國內(nèi)民族主義感情的支持。至少在奧運(yùn)結(jié)束之前，中共高層不會(huì)修訂其西藏政策。

2. 上周，若干大使館的關(guān)系告知，胡錦濤在中國對(duì)西藏政策方面態(tài)度堅(jiān)定，北京高層立場一致。關(guān)系們稱，基于胡錦濤自己的西藏經(jīng)歷（他在80年代末任那里的黨委書記），加上西藏問題"極大的"重要性和敏感性，看來不會(huì)有任何高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在西藏問題上向胡錦濤發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)。一名長期的大使館關(guān)系說，象西藏這樣敏感的問題是由9人構(gòu)成的政治局常委決定的，無法得知他們具體的討論情況。"始終相當(dāng)清楚"，胡錦濤"完全控制了對(duì)西藏問題的決策，黨內(nèi)高層誰要敢在這個(gè)問題上發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn)，無異是"政治自殺"，或被稱為"太軟"，或被認(rèn)為是"賣國賊"，甚至可能象胡耀邦在1987年那樣被清除。

3. XXX說，在這個(gè)問題上"絕對(duì)不存在觀點(diǎn)分歧"，對(duì)中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人來說，西藏甚至比臺(tái)灣更重要。在西藏問題上，政治局9名常委中沒有任何人有胡錦濤這樣的經(jīng)歷和權(quán)威。XXX說，1987年和1989年對(duì)抗議活動(dòng)的鎮(zhèn)壓，使胡錦濤獲得了鄧小平"高度的贊揚(yáng)"，這是使他1992年得以進(jìn)入中常委的一個(gè)重要因素。其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可以就臺(tái)灣、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展或政治改革提出與胡不同的意見，但這種情況不適用于西藏。

4. 一些關(guān)系承認(rèn)，黨內(nèi)和社會(huì)中堅(jiān)對(duì)西藏問題有各種不同的觀點(diǎn)，但沒有任何人認(rèn)為高層有著意見分裂現(xiàn)象。比如，XXX承認(rèn)，黨內(nèi)有人提出對(duì)西藏發(fā)出更"溫和" 的聲音，但持這種觀點(diǎn)的絕不是胡錦濤。而胡對(duì)西藏政策握有"完全的"控制。北京事實(shí)上接受了美國對(duì)臺(tái)灣的插手，但中國絕不會(huì)接受境外勢(shì)力對(duì)西藏的"干涉"。

胡錦濤采取"強(qiáng)硬路線"引起了一些批評(píng)。XXX說，他"個(gè)人"傾向于"有節(jié)有度地"接近西藏，包括跟達(dá)賴?yán)飳?duì)話，他承認(rèn)，"只有達(dá)賴?yán)?能夠團(tuán)結(jié)中國境內(nèi)外的大多數(shù)藏人。

5- 6. XXX稱，"許多中堅(jiān)人士"倡議重審對(duì)達(dá)賴?yán)锏恼撸瑢?duì)妖魔化達(dá)賴?yán)锖头磳?duì)與之對(duì)話的立場提出質(zhì)疑。但是，除了"少數(shù)中堅(jiān)人士和知識(shí)分子"，普通黨員的大多數(shù)，以及"98％"的民眾支持黨的現(xiàn)行西藏政策。XXX認(rèn)為，黨內(nèi)對(duì)西藏問題有重大意見分歧"根本是不可想象的"。

比如，XXX說，他不相信胡錦濤和溫家寶對(duì)西藏問題持有不同的立場，盡管有人以溫家寶對(duì)英國首相布朗"溫和的"說法以及他3月30日在老撾對(duì)媒體說的關(guān)于達(dá)賴?yán)锏脑挒橐罁?jù)，認(rèn)為溫家寶有所不同。他說胡和溫相當(dāng)于一塊雙色果糖，一面黑，一面白，但兩面卻是一個(gè)整體。XXX認(rèn)為，溫家寶在西藏問題上"略為溫和一些"，但在他看來這是溫的風(fēng)格，并不能表明對(duì)官定政策的異見。XXX同意這種看法，認(rèn)為"溫就是溫"，他幾乎在任何問題上都表現(xiàn)得更溫，但他的觀點(diǎn)跟官方路線沒有顯示出重大的區(qū)別來。

7- 10. "南方都市報(bào)"4月3日發(fā)表了一篇博文，對(duì)黨在西藏事件報(bào)導(dǎo)方面的嚴(yán)格管制提出了批評(píng)，"南方周末"發(fā)表的一篇文章要求與達(dá)賴?yán)飳?duì)話。但 PolOffs（注：估計(jì)是大使館政治處官員或政情官員的縮寫）交談過的"關(guān)系"們普遍認(rèn)為這并不表明南方這兩個(gè)媒體在西藏問題上跟中央唱反調(diào)。

XXX 認(rèn)為，這兩篇文章確實(shí)反映了一些中堅(jiān)人士重審西藏政策的愿望，他指出，其中一篇文章受到了黨內(nèi)許多人的批評(píng)。XXX說，這兩篇文章只不過反映了這兩家報(bào)紙"傳統(tǒng)的自由特色"。XXX說，這兩家報(bào)紙過去都沒有在宣傳部官員那兒遭遇麻煩。

令人驚訝的是，甚至XXX都沒有讀過他的集團(tuán)里的報(bào)紙發(fā)表的這兩篇文章。在PolOffs介紹了文章內(nèi)容后，他對(duì)這兩篇文章具有政治重要性表示強(qiáng)烈懷疑。他說，這些文章也許是反映了對(duì)黨修訂媒體戰(zhàn)略的愿望。 XXX估計(jì)，南方周末總編肯定得到了黨的宣傳機(jī)關(guān)的批準(zhǔn)才會(huì)發(fā)表那篇文章，否則，一個(gè)編輯如果敢自作主張發(fā)表這樣敏感話題的文章，他會(huì)被"立即解職"的。 XXX反問道，胡錦濤親自主持著關(guān)于西藏問題的報(bào)導(dǎo)，哪個(gè)報(bào)紙編輯敢公然挑戰(zhàn)官方的路線，哪怕是含沙射影的？XXX估計(jì)，由于黨對(duì)西藏問題的宣傳政策"略有失誤"，因此允許南方周末就此作出"有更多細(xì)微差別"的報(bào)導(dǎo)。

XXX指出，這體現(xiàn)了宣傳部門最近允許有"差異空間"的精神。但他同時(shí)說明，但是，西藏問題"太敏感"了，宣傳部門反而規(guī)定了"非常嚴(yán)格"的報(bào)導(dǎo)方針。

11. 幾乎所有XXX都認(rèn)為，民族情緒的上漲給黨添了翼。他們都對(duì)PolOffs強(qiáng)調(diào)道，中國人對(duì)西方對(duì)西藏問題"扭曲事實(shí)"的憤怒是真實(shí)的，廣泛的，會(huì)產(chǎn)生長時(shí)間的效應(yīng)。關(guān)系們自己似乎也都對(duì)西方媒體的報(bào)導(dǎo)感到憤怒。XXX強(qiáng)調(diào)說，他所認(rèn)識(shí)的"每一個(gè)人"都對(duì)西方的報(bào)導(dǎo)和抵制奧運(yùn)開幕式的呼吁和一些人要求西藏獨(dú)立感到憤怒。民眾的感覺是，西方要"讓中國倒下"。XXX則認(rèn)為，民族主義確實(shí)在蔓延和燃燒，但他認(rèn)為主要集中在25到35歲的年齡群里。

12. 關(guān)系們說，不管民族主義燃燒的原因是什么，它極大地增大了民眾對(duì)黨的西藏政策的支持度。XXX認(rèn)為，這是一個(gè)自然的結(jié)果，中國人的民族主義近年來增強(qiáng)了，基于中國的迅速發(fā)展。XXX認(rèn)為，黨的宣傳機(jī)器有目的地增強(qiáng)著中國人的民族感情，以換取民眾對(duì)中央西藏政策的更大支持，這方面他們獲得了非常大的成功。西藏事件把民眾"完全團(tuán)結(jié)"到了黨和政府的身后，XXX說，這樣的事情在整個(gè)80年代和90年代都是"不可想象的"。

13. XXX警告道，盡管當(dāng)前對(duì)黨的西藏政策的支持度相當(dāng)高，但公眾的感情也會(huì)限制領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的行動(dòng)。XXX說，民族主義始終是黨的統(tǒng)治"支柱"之一，但中央領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不希望它"失控"。也許出于這個(gè)原因，中國宣傳機(jī)構(gòu)已下令減少對(duì)西方媒體的攻擊。

英文鏈接和全文如下：

全文在此http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/04/08BEIJING1454.html 

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001454

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2033
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KOLY CH
SUBJECT: HU JINTAO IN CHARGE OF TIBET POLICY; LEADERSHIP
UNIFIED, BUOYED AND CONSTRAINED BY NATIONALIST SENTIMENT

REF: A. OSC cpp20080407530001
¶B. OSC cpp20080408507001
¶C. OSC fea20080407617427

Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) President Hu Jintao remains firmly in charge of
China's policy on Tibet, with the leadership unified over
Beijing's current hard-line stance and buoyed by rising PRC
nationalist sentiment, xxxxx.
Given Hu's background and experience in Tibet, as well as
the "extremely sensitive" nature of the issue, no one would
"dare" challenge Hu or the Party line, contacts say. While
there may be differences in how various leaders publicly
articulate China's Tibet policy, there are no substantive
differences among the top leadership. Similarly, Embassy
sources do not believe that two recent articles in
Party-controlled southern newspapers signaled leadership
debate or a review of policy, instead arguing the pieces
perhaps reflect an adjustment in the Party's media strategy.
The Party has been buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment,
fueled in part by anger at the West over "biased" media
reporting on Tibet and Olympic-related protests, but this
nationalistic fervor also constrains future policy choices.
Regardless, any modification of Tibet policy is unlikely in
the short term, at least until after the Olympics, contacts
say. End Summary.

Hu Jintao Firmly in Charge, Leadership Unified
--------------------------------------------- -

¶2. (C) President Hu Jintao is firmly in charge of the PRC's
Tibet policy, with the leadership unified over Beijing's
current hard-line stance, several Embassy contacts told
PolOffs over the past week. Sources argued that given Hu
Jintao's own expertise and experience regarding Tibet (Hu was
provincial party secretary in Tibet in the late 1980s), as
well as the "extreme" importance and sensitivity of the Tibet
issue, it would be virtually "impossible" for any leader to
challenge Hu on Tibet. An issue as sensitive as Tibet policy
would be controlled by a small group of top leaders, limited
primarily to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), meaning it is difficult to know precisely the content
of leadership discussions on Tibet, longtime Embassy contact
xxxxx.
Nevertheless, "it is still quite clear," xxxxx argued, that Hu
Jintao is "completely" in charge of the Tibet issue, and no
other leader would "dare" confront Hu or the Party line over
such a critical issue. Doing so would be "political suicide"
and would make any leader vulnerable to charges of being
"soft," or even being a "traitor," risking eventual removal,
a la the ouster of former Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang
in 1987, xxxxx averred.

¶3. (C) There is "absolutely no division" within the
leadership on Tibet, xxxxx. For the
Chinese leadership, Tibet is even more sensitive than Taiwan.
Among the nine members of the PBSC who are controlling
China's Tibet policy, no one has the stature or experience to
challenge Hu, xxxxx said, noting that four are brand new
members of the PBSC, and no one on the PBSC other than Hu has
direct experience in Tibet. It was Hu Jintao, as then-Party
Secretary in Tibet, who oversaw the "quick and effective

Sipdis
suppression" of protests there in 1987 and 1989, which earned
him "great praise" from then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
and which was an important factor in his elevation to the
PBSC in 1992, xxxxx recalled. Thus, Hu has "great confidence"
when it comes to Tibet, putting him in a virtually
unassailable position. There may be room within the
leadership for expressing differences with Hu on issues such
as Taiwan, economic development or political reform, but not
on Tibet, xxxxx asserted.

Different Views Exist in Party, but No Disagreement at Top
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶4. (C) A range of contacts have acknowledged that there are
differences of opinion within the Party and among elites
regarding Tibet, though none believed this reflected any
disagreement among the top leadership. For example,xxxxx acknowledged the presence of
more "moderate" voices on Tibet within the Party, but he
nevertheless stressed that it is Hu Jintao who is
"completely" in charge of China's Tibet policy. Moreover, it

Beijing 00001454 002 of 004


is clear that those such as Hu favoring a "hard line" are
calling the shots. (Note:xxxxx view
that Tibet policy is more sensitive for China's leadership
than even Taiwan, noting that despite its rhetoric, Beijing
has de facto accepted the involvement of the United States in
Taiwan, but China can never accept the "interference" of
foreign powers in Tibet.)xxxxx,
confessed that he "personally" favors a more "measured"
approach to Tibet, to include dialogue with the Dalai Lama,
given that "only the Dalai Lama" can unify the majority of
the Tibetan community both within China and abroad.

¶5. (C) Separately, xxxxx "many elites" are advocating
a reassessment of policy toward the Dalai Lama, questioning
the wisdom of demonizing and refusing to negotiate with him.
According to xxxxx however, apart from a "minority" of
"elites" and "intellectuals," the majority of the Party
rank-and-file, as well as "98 percent" of the public, support
the current policy. Any serious disagreement over Tibet
among the Party leadership is "simply unimaginable," xxxxx
stated, a view separately shared xxxxx.

Public Statements: Difference in Nuance, not Substance
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶6. (C) While there may be differences in how various leaders
have publicly articulated China's Tibet policy, there are no
substantive differences among the top leadership, contacts
asserted. For example, xxxxx said he
does not believe there is disagreement between President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao over Tibet, as some have
speculated based on Wen's purportedly more "moderate"
comments to UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his statement
to the media in Laos on March 30 regarding the Dalai Lama.
xxxx asserted that, on Tibet, Hu and Wen are like a
"restaurant sugar packet," black on one side and white on the
other, but still part of the same whole. In other words, Hu
and Wen merely emphasize different aspects of the same
policy. xxxxx said xxxxx"sensed" Wen may be
"slightly more moderate" on Tibet than some other leaders,
but he thought that represents Wen's style and does not imply
a disagreement over official policy. xxxxx shared this view,
attributing the Prime Minister's March 30 remarks to "Wen
simply being Wen" and appearing more "moderate and
reasonable" on almost every issue, even though his comments
represented no serious departure from the official line.

Southern Media Pieces Reflect No Division over Policy
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶7. (C) xxxxx did not think that two
recent articles in Party-controlled southern newspapers
signaled leadership debate or divisions, instead offering
that the articles perhaps reflected an adjustment in the
Party's media strategy. Both articles appeared on April 3 in
Guangdong Provincial Party papers that have a reputation for
pushing the limits of Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
guidelines. The first, which appeared in a blog run by
Southern Metropolis (Nanfang Dushibao), was critical of the
Party's restrictions on reporting in Tibet, arguing that
allowing foreign reporters to cover the story directly would
provide a more accurate picture of events. The second,
published in Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumou), argued that
most Tibetans are not separatists and do not support or
participate in the unrest or advocate violence, and that such
distinctions should be made when responding to the issue.
The article also called for talks with the Dalai Lama. (See
refs A-C.)

¶8. (C) xxxxx with whom
PolOffs met in the last week had not read or heard of either
article, which PolOffs interpreted as a sign that the pieces
are not terribly significant. xxxxx, explicitly made
this point, arguing that the article in the Southern
Metropolis did not represent anything other than the
"pro-Western slant" of the Southern Daily Media Group and
"liberal southern journalists." The piece would only be
significant if more "authoritative" media outlets had picked
it up. xxxxx, thought it represented a desire among some
elites for a review of Tibet policy but also noted that the
piece was criticized by many internally in the Party. xxxxx, saying that
the articles merely reflected the "traditionally liberal"
stances of both newspapers, which are noted for "pushing the
envelope" ("da cabianqiu," literally "playing edge ball").

Beijing 00001454 003 of 004


It is too early to tell whether these pieces have crossed a
red line, xxxxx said, noting that both papers have often
gotten into trouble with propaganda officials in the past.

¶9. (C) Surprisingly, even the xxxxx had
not read either article that appeared in his group's
newspapers. In response to PolOff's summary of the pieces,
he strongly doubted they carried any political significance.
Perhaps, he said, they represent an adjustment in the Party's
media strategy. The Southern Weekend editor-in-chief must
have had prior approval from Party authorities to publish the
piece, xxxxx surmised, otherwise the editor would have been
"dismissed immediately" for publishing such a sensitive
article on his own. With Hu Jintao himself in charge of the
media response to Tibet, xxxxx asked rhetorically, what
newspaper editor would dare challenge the official media
line, even implicitly? Therefore, the article's import, xxxxx
claimed, is that it demonstrates the "slight loosening" of
Party propaganda guidance on Tibet coverage beginning in late
March, which purportedly allows for the "more nuanced"
reporting advocated in the Southern Weekend article itself.

¶10. (C) Similarly, xxxxx was not aware of the articles. After
listening to PolOff's explanation of them, however, xxxxx
commented that the pieces likely represent the fact that
there is "room for diversity" under the Propaganda
Department's latest guidance. (Note: Despite this supposed
"room" for more nuanced reporting on Tibet, xxxxx
said Tibet is "far too sensitive" and his magazine has
therefore decided "not to touch" the story for now.xxxxx,
reportedly have been "ordered" to produce cover stories on
Tibet under "very strict" guidelines from the Propaganda
Department.)

Party Buoyed by Nationalist Sentiment...
----------------------------------------

¶11. (C) Almost all of xxxxx the Party has been
buoyed by rising nationalist sentiment, fueled in part by
anger at the West over "biased" media reporting on Tibet and
Olympic-related protests.xxxxx all emphasized to
PolOff that Chinese "anger" over the West's "bias" on Tibet
is real, widespread and will have long-term effects. xxxxx
them seemed themselves to be angry over Western
media reporting, refusing to recognize the irony that for
most Chinese, their only access to this "biased Western
reporting" is through the official PRC press agency Xinhua's
characterization of it. xxxxx emphasized that virtually
"everyone" he knows is angry and believes that Western
reporting, together with calls for boycotting the Olympic
opening ceremony, implies support for Tibetan independence
and makes the public feel that the West is trying to "keep
China down." xxxxx, meanwhile, said
nationalism is definitely surging, but he thought this
sentiment is largely concentrated in the 25-35-year-old age
group among both Hans and Tibetans.

¶12. (C) Whatever the causes of the surge in nationalism, the
result has been a dramatic increase in support for the
Party's policy on Tibet, contacts say. xxxxx said this outcome is partly a "natural"
reaction to the fact that Chinese have in recent years become
more nationalistic as a result of growing pride over China's
rapid development, with the Tibet furor merely providing the
most recent "spark" to inflame passions. xxxx separately acknowledged, however, that the Party's
propaganda line has also purposefully stoked nationalistic
feelings in order to rally the public in support of the
Center's Tibet policy, and so far, it has been very
successful in doing so. The recent Tibet crisis has
"completely unified" the people behind the Party and
Government, something that had been "unthinkable" throughout
most of the 1980s and 1990s,xxxxx asserted.

...But Also Constrained by Popular Passions
-------------------------------------------

¶13. (C) Although support for the Party over Tibet is
currently quite high, popular passions also serve to
constrain the leadership's options, xxxxx
warned. Nationalism remains one "pillar" of Party rule, but
central leaders do not want to let these feelings "spin out
of control," xxxxx said. Perhaps reflecting these concerns,
the Propaganda Department earlier this month reportedly
directed that attacks on the Western press in China's
official media be curtailed, according xxxxx

Beijing 00001454 004 of 004


xxxxx. That has not, however, stopped Chinese bloggers
from continuing their attacks via the Internet, xxxxx
observed.xxxxx also expressed concern about the
long-term implications of the surge in nationalism, noting
that "nothing is ever completely good." At any rate, there
is "virtually no way" the Center could initiate a change in
policy toward Tibet and the Dalai Lama, at least in the short
term, given the popular anger over such issues, xxxxx said.

Policy Change Unlikely in the Short Term
----------------------------------------

¶14. (C) Major policy adjustment on Tibet is highly unlikely
for the foreseeable future for a host of reasons other than
popular sentiment, at least until after the Olympics,
contacts say. Given Hu's own legacy in Tibet, where he
cracked down on similar demonstrations in 1987 and 1989, Hu
Jintao will likely be loath to adopt a "softer" line, lest
his own policies and past actions come under criticism,
xxxxx argued. Moreover, it will be
almost "impossible" for Chinese leaders to reorient policy if
they look like they are doing so under international
pressure, xxxxx assessed. Moreover,
xxxxx observed, domestic stability remains the
leadership's top priority above all else, meaning there will
"almost surely" be no relaxation of the current hard line on
Tibet or in places like Xinjiang. xxxxx said he sensed
Chinese leaders worry they could lose control of Tibet if
they do not maintain tight control there, which would have
both domestic consequences and could invite "unwanted
interference" from India.

¶15. (C) While staging a successful Olympics is also a
priority, xxxxx said he senses the leadership has
assessed that at a minimum, athletes will show up to the
Games. As a result, the Center is starting to adjust public
expectations about the Games by saying that, even if there is
a "boycott" of the opening ceremony, that is not important,
given that it is the IOC and respective National Olympic
Committees, not the Chinese Government, hat decide whether
to invite national leaders. (Note: xxxxx disagreed,
saying that, in his view, the success of the Games for
Chinese leaders hinges on whether President Bush attends the
opening ceremonies.) xxxxx said
that Hu Jintao's comments on April 12 to Australian PM Rudd
on the margins of the Bo'ao Forum, which were reported via
Xinhua and reflected China's hard-line stance on Tibet to
date, signaled that domestically there is "no room for
debate" on the Tibet issue. Only after Tibetan areas have
"settled down" and the Olympics have concluded, will there be
any chance for a possible review of Tibet policy, he asserted.
Randt

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