早在13年前的2001年1月25日，紐約時報就告訴我們：孟山都公司失敗了，被收購了。文章娓娓道來，內容卻殺氣騰騰。生物技術公司，即轉基因公司，不把世界改造成轉基因的世界，誓不罷休。如果中國沒有在那一年加入WTO,那么2001年孟山都公司就死定了。中國大豆成了米國孟山都公司的墊腳石，入世成了米國轉基因擴散的合法渠道。中國救了轉基因一次，救了對手美國。轉基因農業因為中國敞開接納生物技術的有毒產品而多延續了13年。不會再有下一次了——干掉無惡不作的孟山都公司，干掉轉基因——星星之火正在燎原。
邪惡的轉基因技術不久就要全面失敗了。讓我們做好一切準備，迎接它的垂死掙扎。2014-6-4
Biotechnology Food: From the Lab to a Debacle
生物技術食品：從一場實驗到一地雞毛
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/25/business/25FOOD.html
January 25, 2001
2001年1月25日
By KURT EICHENWALD, GINA KOLATA and MELODY PETERSEN
科特?艾欣沃爾德，吉拉?考拉特，梅勒蒂?彼特森報道
The following article was reported by Kurt Eichenwald, Gina Kolata and Melody Petersen and was written by Mr. Eichenwald.
以下文章內容來自科特?艾欣沃爾德，吉拉?考拉特和梅勒蒂?彼特森的報道，由艾欣沃爾德撰寫。
In late 1986, four executives of the Monsanto Company, the leader in agricultural biotechnology, paid a visit to Vice President George Bush at the White House to make an unusual pitch.
1986年末，四位孟山都公司—農業生物技術行業的龍頭老大—的總經理來到白宮拜訪了副總統喬治•布什。此行非比尋常。
Although the Reagan administration had been championing deregulation across multiple industries, Monsanto had a different idea: the company wanted its new technology, genetically modified food, to be governed by rules issued in Washington and wanted the White House to champion the idea.
里根當局一直主張放松對社會各行各業的行政管理，孟山都公司對此卻有不同看法：它很想將自己的轉基因食品這項新技術置于聯邦法規的管理之下，很想白宮支持這一想法。
"There were no products at the time," Leonard Guarraia, a former Monsanto executive who attended the Bush meeting, recalled in a recent interview. "But we bugged him for regulation. We told him that we have to be regulated."
“當時市面上還沒有這種產品，”在最近的一次訪談中，參加了當年與布什會面的前孟山都總經理萊昂納德•瓜雷亞憶起。“但是我們不停地煩他，要求他對此實施監管。我們告訴他這種產品必須受到監管。”
Government guidelines, the executives reasoned, would reassure a public that was growing skittish about the safety of this radical new science. Without such controls, they feared, consumers might become so wary they could doom the multibillion-dollar gamble that the industry was taking in its efforts to redesign plants using genes from other organisms including other species.
這幾位高管的理由是，政府的方針政策能安撫越來越敏感的公眾，不對轉基因這種全新技術的安全性擔憂。他們擔心，若沒有那些管控措施，消費者的疑慮最終可能毀掉孟山都公司的這場大膽賭局—他們重塑了植物，用了來自其他生物的基因，已經花費了數十億美元。
In the weeks and months that followed, the White House complied, working behind the scenes to help Monsanto long a political power with deep connections in Washington get the regulations that it wanted.
在其后的幾個月里，白宮就給了孟山都公司它想要的管理規則。孟山都在華盛頓政界人脈極深廣
It was an outcome that would be repeated, again and again, through three administrations. What Monsanto wished for from Washington, Monsanto and, by extension, the biotechnology industry got. If the company's strategy demanded regulations, rules favored by the industry were adopted. And when the company abruptly decided that it needed to throw off the regulations and speed its foods to market, the White House quickly ushered through an unusually generous policy of self-policing.
這個成功被一再被復制，已歷三屆政府。孟山都從華盛頓得其所求，那正是生物技術業界之所求。讓政府來管理是公司的戰略，政府的法規必會偏向公司;一旦公司決定要加速銷售，白宮一定會寬宏大量地讓公司自己管自己。
Even longtime Washington hands said that the control this nascent industry exerted over its own regulatory destiny through the Environmental Protection Agency, the Agriculture Department and ultimately the Food and Drug Administration was astonishing.
連華府的資深人士都說，這一新興產業玩弄環保署，農業部，食品藥物管理局以制定對自己有利的管理規則所顯示的控制力令人心悸。
"In this area, the U.S. government agencies have done exactly what big agribusiness has asked them to do and told them to do," said Dr. Henry Miller, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, who was responsible for biotechnology issues at the Food and Drug Administration from 1979 to 1994.
“在這一領域，美國政府各部門機構就是農業巨頭企業名符其實的忠仆，”胡佛研究所高級研究員，曾于1979至1994年間在食品與藥物管理局負責生物技術問題的亨利·米勒博士如是說道。
The outcome, at least according to some fans of the technology? "Food biotech is dead," Dr. Miller said. "The potential now is an infinitesimal fraction of what most observers had hoped it would be."
對于一些生物技術愛好者來說，結果是：“食品生物技術已死，”米勒博士說道。“它只表達了所期待的巨大潛力的一點點”
While the verdict is surely premature, the industry is in crisis. Genetically modified ingredients may be in more than half of America's grocery products. But worldwide protest has been galvanized. The European markets have banned the products and some American food producers are backing away. A recent discovery that certain taco shells manufactured by Kraft contained Starlink, a modified corn classified as unfit for human consumption, prompted a sweeping recall and did grave harm to the idea that self-regulation was sufficient. The mighty Monsanto has merged with a pharmaceutical company.
下判決的確為時過早，但這一行業確實陷入了危機。美國大半的食品中可能都含有轉基因成分，但全世界對轉基因食品的抵制越發強烈。歐洲市場禁止了這種產品。一些美國食品生產商也退出去了 。不久前卡夫食品公司的某些玉米卷中發現了星聯玉米，是規定為不適合人類食用的?？ǚ蚬静坏貌淮笠幠Ｕ一禺a品，對企業自我監管的信心是致命一擊。而強大的孟山都已開始合并制藥公司了。
How could an industry so successful in controlling its own regulations end up in such disarray?
一個能玩弄監管措施如此得心應手的行業何以也會亂套？
The answer pieced together from confidential industry records, court documents and government filings, as well as interviews with current and former officials of industry, government and organizations opposing the use of bioengineering in food provides a stunning example of how management, with a few miscalculations, can steer an industry headlong into disaster.
找到答案有待湊齊行業機密文件、法庭文件和政府文檔，加上對各方人士的采訪記錄，包括如今或以往任職本行業者或政府官員，還有反對將生物工程技術用于食品的機構。得到的是一個觸目驚心的實例，讓我們看到僅僅在監管上幾步失算，就可以把一整個行業導入災難。
For many years, senior executives at Monsanto, the industry's undisputed leader, believed that they faced enormous obstacles from environmental and consumer groups opposed to the new technology. Rather than fight them, the original Monsanto strategy was to bring in opponents as consultants, hoping their participation would ease the foods' passage from the laboratory to the shopping cart.
很多年來，業界無可爭議的領袖，孟山都公司的高級管理人員一直相信，是環保和消費者團體反對新技術給他們造成了巨大的障礙。孟山都公司最初的戰略不是打擊他們，而是把反對者請進來做顧問，希望他們的參與能讓轉基因食品更加容易地從實驗室走入市場。
"We thought it was at least a decade-long job, to take our efforts and present them to environmental groups and the general public, and gradually win support for this," said Earle Harbison Jr., the president and chief operating officer at Monsanto during the late 1980's.
“當時我們認為，向環保組織和消費者展示我們的成果并逐漸讓他們支持轉基因技術至少需要十年之久的努力，”20世紀80年代末期擔任孟山都公司總裁及首席運營官的小厄爾•哈比森說道。
But come the early 1990's, the strategy changed. A new management team took over at Monsanto, one confident that worries about the new technology had been thoroughly disproved by science. The go-slow approach was shelved in favor of a strategy to erase regulatory barriers and shove past the naysayers. The switch invigorated the opponents of biotechnology and ultimately dismayed the industry's allies the farmers, agricultural universities and food companies.
然而，到了20世紀90年代初，公司的戰略變了。孟山都公司新上任的管理團隊相信科學已經完全掃除了對這項新技術的擔憂。“慢慢來”的方法被新的戰略取代——清除監管壁壘，推開反對者。這下激怒了生物技術的反對者，并最終讓這個行業的盟友們—農民，農業大學以及食品公司—大失所望。
"Somewhere along the line, Monsanto specifically and the industry in general lost the recipe of how we presented our story," said Will Carpenter, the head of the company's biotechnology strategy group until 1991. "When you put together arrogance and
incompetence, you've got an unbeatable combination. You can get blown up in any direction. And they were."
“自某時起，以孟山都和整個行業丟失了章法，”擔任孟山都公司生物技術戰略組負責人直至1991年的威爾•卡朋特說道。“當你變得既傲慢又無能時，你就沒戲了。你會處處挨打。而事實也確實如此。”
Biology Debate
辯論生物學
New Microbes Bring New Fears
新微生物帶來新恐慌
In the summer of 1970, Janet E. Mertz was working at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, picking up tips on animal viruses from Dr. Robert Pollack, a professor at the private research center on Long Island and a master in the field. One day she began to explain to Dr. Pollack the experiment she was planning when she returned
to her graduate studies in the fall at Stanford University with her adviser, Dr. Paul Berg. They were preparing to take genes from a monkey virus and put them into a commonly used strain of bacteria, E. coli, as part of an effort to figure out the purposes of different parts of a gene.
1970年夏，珍妮特·E·默茨在冷泉港實驗室里忙碌著，她正在斟酌羅伯特.波拉克(Robert Pollack)博士關于動物病毒的建議。波拉克博士是長島一個私人研究中心的研究員，也是該領域的專家。某日她對波拉克博士講述她的實驗計劃。秋季她將到斯坦福大學繼續研究生學業，和她的導師保羅.伯格(Paul Berg)博士一起進行這個實驗。他們準備從猴子病毒中提取基因，插入到一種實驗中常用的細菌大腸桿菌中，以弄清楚基因的每個部分的功能。
Dr. Pollack was horrified. The virus she planned to use contained genes that could cause cancer in rodents, he reminded her. Strains of E. coli live in human intestines. What if the viral genes created a cancer- causing microbe that could be spread from person to person the way unmodified E. coli can. Dr. Pollack wanted Ms. Mertz's project halted immediately. .
波拉克博士極為震驚，提醒她猴病毒中含有可導致嚙齒動物患癌的基因。大腸桿菌也生活在人腸道中，假如病毒基因創造出一種致癌微生物，像沒有轉過基因的大腸桿菌一樣在人際轉播，那該怎么辦?波拉克博士希望她的項目立刻停止。
"I said to Janet, `There's a human experiment I don't want to be
part of,' " Dr. Pollack said in a recent interview.
“我對珍妮特說，這是拿人做實驗，我不想沾邊”，波拉克博士在最近的一次采訪中說道。
The resulting transcontinental shouting match between Dr. Pollack and Dr. Berg set off a debate among biologists around the world as they contemplated questions that seemed lifted from science fiction. Were genetically modified bacteria superbugs? Would they be more powerful than naturally occurring bacteria? Would scientists who wanted to study them have to move their research to the sort of secure labs used to study diseases like the black plague?
波拉克博士和伯格博士之間隨后發生的爭吵，引發了全世界生物學家的辯論，辯題就像來自科幻小說一樣。轉基因病菌是超級細菌嗎?這些病菌會不會比自然中的細菌更加強大?研究此類病菌的科學家是否應該搬到萬無一失的實驗室去，就像研究黑死病那樣?
"The notion of being able to move genes between species was an
alarming thought," said Alexander Capron, a professor of law and
medicine at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.
"People talked about there being species barriers you're reorganizing nature in some way."
亞歷山大.卡普綸(Alexander Capron)是南加州大學洛杉磯分校的一位教授，他說：“把基因在不同物種間移動的想法，令人警覺。人們這樣談論物種隔離，是有點想要重組自然。”
As researchers joined in the debate, they came to the conclusion that strict controls were needed on such experiments until scientists understood the implications. In 1975, the elite of the field gathered at the Asilomar conference center in Pacific Grove, Calif. There, they recommended that all molecular biologists refrain from doing certain research and abide by stringent regulations for other experiments. To monitor themselves, they set up a committee at the National Institutes of Health to review and
approve all research projects.
加入辯論的研究者得出結論：在科學家們弄清楚后果之前，對此類實驗要嚴格控制。1975年，業內精英云集加州太平洋叢林市的艾西洛瑪會議中心。 在那次會議上，他們建議所有分子生物學家都不要做某些實驗，在其他實驗中嚴格遵守有關規定。為了自我監督，他們還在聯邦衛生部設立了一個委員會來審核和批準所有的研究項目。
It took just a few years and hundreds of experiments before the most urgent questions had their answers. Over and over again, scientists created bacteria with all manner of added or deleted genes and then mixed them with naturally occurring bacteria.
為了回答最緊迫的問題，用了幾年時間，做了幾百次實驗?？茖W家們一次又一次地制造各種細菌，有基因增加的，也有基因刪除的，然后與自然的細菌混合。
But rather than creating superbugs, the scientists found themselves struggling to keep the engineered bacteria from dying as the more robust naturally occurring bacteria crowded them out.
超級細菌沒有出現，科學家反而發現需要費盡心機保護被創造出的細菌存活，因為它們不斷遭到生命力強大的自然細菌的排擠。
It turned out that adding almost any gene to bacteria cells only weakened them. They needed coddling in the laboratory to survive. And the E. coli that Ms. Mertz had wanted to use were among the feeblest of all.
事實證明在細菌中加入任何基因都只會削弱它們。這些細菌需要在實驗室里精心培育才能存活。而默茨想要使用的大腸桿菌是最脆弱的一種。
By the mid-1980's, the Institutes of Health lifted its restrictions. Even scientists like Dr. Pollack, who sounded the initial alarm, were satisfied that the experiments were safe.
1980年代中期，衛生部取消了有關限制。即使最早敲響警鐘的波拉克博士也相信了這種實驗是安全的。
"The answer came out very clearly," he said. "Putting new genes into bacteria did not have the unintended consequence of making the bacteria dangerous."
他說：“答案是清楚的，將新的基因植入細菌不會使細菌變得危險。”
That decision echoed through industry like the sound of a starter's pistol. First out of the gate were the pharmaceutical companies, with a rapid series of experiments on how the new science could be used in medicines. Hundreds of drugs went into development, including human insulin for diabetes, Activase for the treatment of heart attacks, Epogen for renal disease and the hepatitis B vaccine.
這一決定像發令槍一樣響徹整個行業。醫藥公司率先做了一系列實驗，探索新科學如何應用于制藥。數百種藥被開發，包括治療糖尿病的人胰島素、治療心臟病的阿替普酶、治療腎臟疾病的阿法依泊汀和乙肝疫苗。
"It's been huge," said Dr. David Golde, physician in chief at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York. "It has changed human health."
紐約紀念斯隆—凱特琳癌癥中心首席醫生大衛.戈爾德(David Golde)說到：“這件事非常大，已經改變了人類的健康。”
The success that modifying living organisms would bring the pharmaceutical industry quickly attracted attention from some of the nation's largest agricultural companies, eager to extend their staid businesses into an arena that Wall Street had endowed with
such glamour.
修飾生物體在醫藥業取得成功，很快引起了美國最大的幾家農業公司的注意。它們迫切想要擴展停滯的公司業務，走進這個被華爾街追捧的領域。
Reaching Out
推廣
Monsanto Takes a Soft Approach
孟山都智取不硬來
In June 1986, Mr. Harbison took control of Monsanto's push into biotechnology, a project snared in mystery and infighting. A 19-year veteran of Monsanto who had recently become its president and chief operating officer, he formed a committee to lead the charge.
1986年6月，??孟山都大舉進軍神秘莫測又備受爭議的生物技術行業時，哈比森(Harbison)在掌控大局。他是孟山都的一員老將，任職長達19年，最近成為該公司的總裁兼首席營運官。為此他組建了一個委員會。
"There is little more important than this task in our corporation at this time," Mr. Harbison wrote to the 13 executives selected for the assignment.
“此時此刻，這是我公司的頭等任務。”哈比森致信新上任的13個高管。
"We recognized early on," Mr. Harbison said in a recent interview, "that while developing lifesaving drugs might be greeted with fanfare, monkeying around with plants and food would be greeted with skepticism." And so Mr. Harbison drafted a plan to reach out to affected groups from environmentalists to farmers to win their support.
“我們很早就認識到，”哈比森在最近的一次采訪中說道，“研發救命的藥物可能需要鼓吹，改變做食品的農作物會受到質疑。”哈比森為此起草了一個計劃，試圖贏得從環保主義者到農民這些群體的支持。
That same month, the company's lobbying effort for regulation began to show its first signs of success. The Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration were given authority over different aspects of the business, from field testing of new ideas to the review of new foods.
同月，該公司四處游說尋求監管的努力顯示了最初的成功跡象。環保署、農業部和食品藥品管理局被分別賦予針對這個行業的權力，從在田間測試新思路到審核新食品，不一而足。
In an administration committed to deregulation, the heads of some agencies had been opposed to new rules. At an early meeting, William Ruckelshaus, then the head of the E.P.A., expressed skepticism that his agency should play any role in regulating field testing, according to people who attended. That was overcome only when Monsanto executives raised the specter of Congressional hearings about the use of biotechnology to create crops that contain their own pesticides, these people said.
那是一個到處在撤銷管制規定的時代，某些部門的負責人始終反對搞新規定。據到會者說，在很早的一次會議上，時任環保局負責人的威廉·拉克爾肖斯(William Ruckelshaus)就表示過懷疑，他的機構對于在田間做的實驗能有什么作用?孟山都高管提出，他們的生物技術植物里面有公司的殺蟲劑，環保署不管就只能去搞國會聽證會這才將質疑壓下去。
By fall, Monsanto's strategy committee was developing a plan for introducing biotechnology to the public. A copy of a working draft, dated Oct. 13, 1986, listed what the committee considered the major challenges: organized opposition among environmental groups, political opportunism by elected officials and lack of knowledge among reporters about biotechnology.
一直到秋季，孟山都的戰略委員會都在制定把生物技術推介給公眾的計劃。一個工作草案的副本(日期為1986年10月13日)開列出他們面臨的重大挑戰：環保團體有組織的反對、政府官員的政治投機，媒體記者不了解生物技術。
It also highlighted more complex issues, including ethical questions about "tinkering with the human gene pool" and the lack of economic incentives to transfer the technology to the third world, where it would probably do the most good.
還有一些更復雜的事，如“擾動人類基因庫”的倫理問題 ，以及向第三世界轉移這個技術缺少經濟激勵,在那里轉基因技術才最有用武之地
To solve political problems, the document suggested engaging elected officials and regulators around the world, "creating support for biotechnology at the highest U.S. policy levels," and working to gain endorsements for the technology in the presidential platforms of both the Republican and Democratic Parties in the 1988 election.
為了解決政治方面的問題，該文件提出把世界各地的官員和監管者都拉進來，“在美國最高的政治層面上把對生物技術的支持建構出來”，并努力爭取在1988年的總統大選中讓兩黨都支持轉基因技術 。
To deal with opponents, the document said, "Active outreach will encourage public interest, consumer and environmental groups to develop supportive positions on biotechnology, and serve as regular advisers to Monsanto."
對付反對者，文件提出，“以積極的工作推動公眾利益組織、消費者和環保組織采取支持生物技術的立場，把他們變成孟山都當顧問。”
Former Monsanto executives said that while they felt confident of the new food's overall safety, they also recognized that bioengineering raised concerns about possible allergens, unknown toxins or environmental effects. Beyond that, there was a reasonable philosophical anxiety about human manipulation of nature.
孟山都的前高管們表示，雖然他們對新食品的一般安全性有信心，但他們也認識到，生物工程引起了人們對可能的過敏原、未知毒素或環境影響的關注。當然還有一種哲學上的不安，那就是人類操控自然。
"If this business was going to work, one of the things we had to do was engage in a dialogue with all of the stakeholders, including the consumer groups and the more rational environmental organizations," said Mr. Carpenter, who headed the biotechnology strategy group. "It wasn't Nobel Prize thinking."
“如果想干成這件事情，我們不得不做的事情之一就是，與所有的利益相關者對話，包括消費者團體和更理性的環保組織，” 生物技術戰略團體的負責人卡彭特先生說道，“這不是像諾貝爾獎那么高深的觀點。 ”
A Blunder Decision on Milk Causes a Furor
牛奶的錯誤引起軒然大波
Even as Monsanto was assembling its outreach strategy, other documents show that it was making strides toward what former executives now acknowledge was a major strategic blunder. The company was preparing to introduce to farmers the first product from its biotechnology program: a growth hormone produced in genetically altered bacteria. Some on the strategy committee pushed for marketing a porcine hormone that would produce leaner and bigger hogs.
與孟山都整合其產品的推廣戰略同時，有文件顯示該公司前任高管日后承認的重大戰略失誤:向農民推廣生物技術的第一款產品：應用轉基因細菌生產的一種生長激素。能使生豬體形彪悍,肉質精瘦。公司戰略委員會的一些人剛好正在敦促這種激素上市銷售。
But, simply because the product was further along in development, the company decided to go forward with a bovine growth hormone, which improves milk production in cows despite vociferous objections of executives who feared that tinkering with a product consumed by children would ignite a national outcry.
由于該生長激素還在研發階段，公司決定推行另一種乳牛生長激素，這種激素將提高牛奶的產量，但公司高管們擔心在兒童食品上做手腳會激起全國性的抗議，都強烈反對乳牛生長激素的使用。
"It was not a wise choice to go out with that product first," Mr. Harbison acknowledged. "It was a mistake."
“立即推廣這種產品是不明智的，”哈比森先生說，“這是一個錯誤。”
Scientists who watched the events remain stunned by Monsanto's decisions.
關注此事的科學家們對孟山都的決定震驚。
"I don't think they really thought through the whole darn thing," Dr. Virginia Walbot, a professor of biological sciences at Stanford University, said of Monsanto's decision to market products that benefited farmers rather than general consumers. "The way Thomas Edison demonstrated how great electricity was was by providing lights for the first nighttime baseball game. People were in awe. What if he had decided to demonstrate the electric chair instead? And what if his second product had been the electric cattle prod? Would we have electricity today?"
“我覺得他們根本就沒有把整個事情想明白。”斯坦福大學生物科學專業的教授，維吉尼亞·沃伯特(Virginia Walbot)博士這樣評價孟山都推廣有益于農民而非普通消費大眾的產品的決定，“愛迪生通過為首次夜間棒球賽提供照明來展示電的神奇和偉大。人們由衷敬佩。但要是他當時決定展示電椅會怎么樣?要是他發明的第二件產品是電牛棒呢?我們會接受用電嗎?”
The decision touched off a furor. Jeremy Rifkin, director of the Foundation on Economic Trends, an opponent of biotechnology, joined with family-farm groups worried about price declines and other organizations in a national campaign to keep the Monsanto hormone out of the marketplace. Some supermarket chains shunned the idea; several dairy states moved to ban it. The first step toward the shopping cart brought only bad news.
孟山都的這一決定引起軒然大波。經濟走勢基金會主席杰里米·里夫金(Jeremy Rifkin)就是一位生物科技的反對者，與擔心價格下跌的數個家庭農場組織等一道，加入了阻止孟山都激素的全國行動。一些連鎖超市紛紛效仿;還有幾個產奶大洲也開始明令禁止這一做法。孟山都激素進軍超市的第一步結果很壞。
One year later, in 1987, the E.P.A. agreed to allow another company, Advanced Genetic Sciences, to test bioengineered bacteria meant to make plants resistant to frost. But under the agency's guidelines, it had to declare the so-called ice-minus bacteria a
new pesticide classifying frost as the pest.
一年后，即1987年，環保署準許另外一家公司——先進基因科學公司(Advanced Genetic Sciences)的加強植物抗霜性狀的生物工程細菌進入試驗。不過，根據環保局的規定，它必須宣布所謂的抗霜細菌是一種新型殺蟲劑，這一來霜凍就被當作害蟲了。
On April 28 and May 28, strawberry and potato plants were sprayed in two California cities. Photographs of scientists in regulation protective gear spacesuits with respirators were broadcast around the world, generating widespread alarm.
4月28日和5月28日分別對加州兩個城市的草莓和馬鈴薯植株噴灑了這種東西。科學家們身如同宇航員那樣的防護套服、佩戴防毒面具的照片瘋傳全球，一時間人心惶惶。
"It was surreal," said Dr. Steven Lindow, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, who helped develop the bacteria.
“這太離奇了!”加州大學伯克利分校教授史蒂芬·林多(Steven Lindow)博士如是說，他參與了開發這個細菌。
For the executives at Monsanto, these troubling experiences reinforced their commitment to the strategy of inclusion and persuasion.
對于孟山都的高管們來說，這些麻煩事使他們更加堅信無孔不入和大力疏導的戰略。
The most complex challenge came in Europe, where there was deep distrust of the new foods, particularly among politically powerful farmers. Faced with such resistance, Mr. Harbison said Monsanto began subtly shifting its attention from the lucrative European market to Asia and Africa. The hope was that the economic realities of a global agricultural marketplace would eventually push Europe toward a more conciliatory attitude.
最麻煩的是來自歐洲的挑戰，歐洲人，尤其是政治上有影響力的農民，對這新食物滿腹疑慮。哈比森說，面對如此之大的反對勢力，孟山都悄悄地從利潤很大的歐洲市場向亞洲和非洲轉移;它希望的是，全球農產品市場的現實經濟力量會最終迫使歐洲的立場變得溫和。
But by the early 1990's, company executives said, everything would change. Mr. Harbison retired. Soon, Monsanto's strategy for biotechnology was being overseen by Robert Shapiro, the former head of Monsanto's Nutrasweet unit, who in 1990 had been named head of the agricultural division.
不過，1990年之后，公司高管們又說，一切都會變。哈比森退休了。孟山都的生物科技戰略由羅伯特·夏皮羅(Robert Shapiro)接手了，他曾是孟山都的阿斯巴甜子公司領導，1990年被任命為孟山都農業部總監。
In no time, former executives said, the strategy inside the company began to change. Mr. Shapiro demonstrated a devout sense of mission about his new responsibilities, these executives said. He repeatedly expressed his belief that Monsanto could help change the world by championing bioengineered agriculture, while simultaneously turning in stellar financial results.
據前任高管們所說，公司內部戰略立即開始調整。夏皮羅對新職責虔誠的使命感充分展現。他多次說過，堅信孟山都將領軍生物工程農業改變世界，并且創造出天文數字的利潤。
Eager to get going, he shelved the go-slow strategy of consultation and review. Monsanto would now use its influence in Washington to push through a new approach.
急于求成的他拋棄了此前的請顧問、搞評審的“慢慢來”戰略，動用孟山都在華府的影響力強推一種新策略。
Mr. Carpenter, the former head of the company's biotechnology strategy group, recalled going to a meeting with Mr. Shapiro, and cautioning that it seemed risky to tamper with a strategic approach that had worked well for the company in the past. But, he said, Mr. Shapiro dismissed his concerns.
卡彭特(Mr. Carpenter)是孟山都生物技術戰略部門的總管，他回憶自己有次與夏皮羅一起開會，提醒過他完全改變過去行之有效的戰略太冒險。但是，他說夏皮羅沒有把他的擔憂當回事。
"Shapiro ignored the stakeholders and almost insulted them and proceeded to spend all of his political coin trying to deal directly with the government on a political basis rather than an open basis," Mr. Carpenter said.
“夏皮羅完全不顧及、不怕冒犯有關利益方，他一意孤行打政治牌，直接用政治手段跟政府非公開地打交道。”卡彭特說道。
Mr. Shapiro, now the nonexecutive chairman of the Pharmacia Corporation, which Monsanto merged with last year, declined to comment. But in an essay published earlier this year by Washington University in St. Louis, he acknowledged that Monsanto had suffered from some of the very faults cited now by critics. `We've learned that there is often a very fine line between scientific confidence on the one hand and corporate arrogance on the other," he wrote. "It was natural for us to see this as a scientific issue. We didn't listen very well to people who insisted that there were relevant ethical, religious, cultural, social and economic issues as well."
夏皮羅如今是法瑪西亞公司(去年為孟山都所兼并)的非執行董事長，他拒絕發表評論。但是，在今年年初發表在圣路易斯華盛頓大學的一篇論文里，他承認孟山都確實犯了評論家們提到的一些重大錯誤而。“我們已經明白，科學上的信心與公司的自大二者之間的界限很容易混淆，”他寫道，“我們把它看作個科學問題是很正常的。我們沒有傾聽人民的聲音，他們堅持認為在這里還有倫理道德、宗教、文化、社會和經濟問題。”
Turning Point
轉折點
Objections by Scientists
科學家們的反對
On May 26, 1992, the vice president, Dan Quayle, proclaimed the Bush administration's new policy on bioengineered food.
1992年5月26日，副總統丹·奎爾宣布了布什政府對生物工程食品的新政策。
"The reforms we announce today will speed up and simplify the process of bringing better agricultural products, developed through biotech, to consumers, food processors and farmers," Mr. Quayle told a crowd of executives and reporters in the Indian Treaty Room of the Old Executive Office Building. "We will ensure that biotech products will receive the same oversight as other products, instead of being hampered by unnecessary regulation."
“我們今天宣布的改革，將會加快速度簡化程序，把生物技術開發出來的更好的農產品帶給消費者，食品加工業和農民”。在老行政辦公樓的印度條約廳，奎爾先生告訴到場的高管和記者，“我們將確保生物技術產品受到同其他產品一樣的監督，不讓沒有必要管制的阻礙它。”
With dozens of new grocery products waiting in the wings, the new policy strictly limited the regulatory reach of the F.D.A, which had oversight responsibility for foods headed to market.
排隊等待批準的新產品有幾十種, 美國食品藥品管理局負責監管即將上市的食品，新政策把監管范圍做了嚴格的限制。
The announcement a salvo in the Bush administration's "regulatory relief" program was in lock step with the new position of industry that science had proved safety concerns to be baseless.
布什政府宣布的“監管解除”項目，和業界的新立場——科學已經證明對安全的擔憂毫無根據完全一致。
"We will not compromise safety one bit," Mr. Quayle told his audience.
奎爾先生又說，“我們決不會在安全性上做出妥協，”。
In the F.D.A.'s nearby offices, not everyone was so sure.
然而，在食品藥品管理局臨近的辦公室里的人都不敢那么肯定。
Among them was Dr. Louis J. Pribyl, one of 17 government scientists working on a policy for genetically engineered food. Dr. Pribyl knew from studies that toxins could be unintentionally created when new genes were introduced into a plant's cells. But under the new edict, the government was dismissing that risk and any other possible risk as no different from those of conventionally derived food. That meant biotechnology companies would not need government approval to sell the foods they were developing.
路易斯·J·Pribyl博士便是其中之一。他是17個制定關于基因工程食品政策的政府科學家之一。他在研究中發現，新的基因導入植物細胞時會在無意中會生成毒素。但在新政策下，這被認為與傳統方法生產的食品無差別，這個風險和其它可能的風險都被政府放過了。這意味著生物技術公司無需獲得政府批準即可銷售他們開發的食品。
"This is the industry's pet idea, namely that there are no unintended effects that will raise the F.D.A.'s level of concern," Dr. Pribyl wrote in a fiery memo to the F.D.A. scientist overseeing the policy's development. "But time and time again, there is no data to back up their contention."
這是業內人士最喜愛的主意，也就是不存在非期望效應，食品藥品管理局無須多慮。”Pribyl博士給食品藥物管理局監負責相關政策發展的科學家寫了一封短信，言辭激烈，“但一次又一次，能證明他們觀點的數據根本就沒有。”
Dr. Pribyl, a microbiologist, was not alone at the agency. Dr. Gerald Guest, director of the center of veterinary medicine, wrote that he and other scientists at the center had concluded there was "ample scientific justification" to require tests and a government review of each genetically engineered food before it was sold.
在同事中并非只有Pribyl博士這一個微生物學家持這種觀點。獸藥中心主任杰拉爾德·格斯特博士曾寫道，他與中心別的科學家曾得出結論，我們有“充分的科學理由”規定在銷售轉基因食品之前，對每一種基因工程食品都進行測試，還要由政府進行審查。
Three toxicologists wrote, "The possibility of unexpected, accidental changes in genetically engineered plants justifies a limited traditional toxicological study."
三位毒理學專家曾寫道，“轉基因植物發生意外改變的可能性，提出了進行一定范圍傳統毒理學研究的必要性。”
The scientists were displaying precisely the concerns that Monsanto executives from the 1980's had anticipated and indeed had considered reasonable. But now, rather than trying to address those concerns, Monsanto, the industry and official Washington were dismissing them as the insignificant worries of the uninformed. Under the final F.D.A. policy that the White House helped usher in, the new foods would be tested only if companies did it. Labeling was ruled out as potentially misleading to the consumer, since it might suggest that there was reason for concern.
科學家們所表達的，恰恰是孟山都高管1980年代就預料到并且也認為有道理的擔憂。現在，孟山都公司和業界以及華盛頓官員已經無視這些問題了，把它們當成因為無知才會產生無足輕重的擔心。白宮出手幫助食品藥品管理局最終推出由公司自愿做測試的新規定。貼標簽的要求被拒絕，理由是誤導消費者，暗示購買這種食品需謹慎。
"Monsanto forgot who their client was," said Thomas N. Urban, retired chairman and chief executive of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, a seed company. "If they had realized their client was the final consumer they should have embraced labeling. They should have said, `We're for it.' They should have said, `We insist that food be labeled.' They should have said, `I'm the consumer's friend here.' There was some risk. But the risk was a hell of a lot less."
“孟山都忘了客戶，”托馬斯•N•厄本，美國一家種子公司先鋒良種國際有限公司(Pioneer Hi-Bred International)，退休的董事長兼首席執行官說道。“如果他們認識到客戶是最終消費者，他們就應欣然同意標識轉基因食品。他們應該說：‘我們支持這樣做。’‘我們堅持轉基因食品應當標識。’他們還應該說：‘我們是消費者的朋友。’這么做確實也有一定的風險，但相比之下風險要小得多。”
Even some who presumably benefited directly from the new policy remain surprised that it was adopted. "How could you argue against labeling?" said Roger Salquist, the former chief executive of Calgene, whose Flavr Savr tomato, engineered for slower spoilage, was the first fruit of biotechnology to reach the grocery store." The public trust has not been nurtured," he added.
對于這項政策，連可能直接受益的人都驚訝無比，“你們怎么可以反對標識?”卡爾金公司(Calgene)前任首席執行官羅杰•沙奎斯說道?？柦鸸镜纳?Flavr Savr)番茄是轉基因食品，特點是不易腐爛，是第一個獲準以食品銷售的生物技術產品。“公眾對轉基因食品的信任還沒有培養起來。”他補充道。
In fact, the F.D.A. policy was just what the small band of activists opposed to biotechnology needed to rally powerful global support to their cause.
事實上，反對生物技術的激進分子小群體正需要F.D.A.這一政策來集結強大的國際力量支持他們的要求。
"That was the turning point," said Jeremy Rifkin, the author and activist who in 1992 had already spent more than a decade trying to stop biotechnology experiments. Immediately after Vice President Quayle announced the F.D.A.'s new policy, Mr. Rifkin began calling for a global moratorium on biotechnology as part of an effort that he and others named the "pure food campaign."
“這是一個轉折點，”杰里米•里夫金說道，他是作家和活躍人士，早在1992年那時就已經干了10多年試圖制止生物技術實驗。在丹•奎爾副總統公布F.D.A.的新政策之后，里夫金先生立即呼吁在全球范圍內停止生物技術研究，他們稱之為“純凈食品運動”。
He quickly began spreading the word to small activist groups around the world that the United States had decided to let the biotechnology industry put the foods on store shelves without tests or labels. Mr. Rifkin said that he got support from dozens of small farming, consumer and animal rights groups in more than 30 countries. In Europe, these small groups helped turn the public against genetically altered foods, tearing up farm fields and holding protests before television cameras.
他很快便把一個消息傳遍世界各地的小型激進組織：美國決定讓生物技術產業把轉基因食品放上貨架，無須測試，也不用標識。里夫金先生說，他得到30多個國家幾十個小型農業團體、消費者團體和動物保護機構的支持。在歐洲，這些小團體推動公眾抵制轉基因食品、鏟除轉基因植物，在電視攝像機前舉行抗議。
If the F.D.A. had required tests and labels, Mr. Rifkin said, "it would have been more difficult for us to mobilize the opposition."
里夫金認為，如果F.D.A.規定轉基因食品必須檢測和標識，“那么動員公眾抵制轉基因食品就沒有那么容易了。”
Today, the handful of nonprofit groups that joined Mr. Rifkin's in lobbying the F.D.A. for stronger regulation in 1992 have multiplied to 54. Those groups, including the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Public Citizen and the Humane Society of the United States, signed a petition this spring demanding that the government take genetically engineered foods off the market until they are tested and labeled.
1992年與里夫金先生一道游說F.D.A.加強監管的非營利組織很少，如今的數量已擴大了54倍。這里有塞拉俱樂部、地球之友、自然資源保護委員會、公共市民團體和美國人道主義協會，他們今年春天聯名簽署了一份請愿書，要求政府把轉基因食品撤下，做完測試貼上標簽再出售。
"There is absolutely no question that the voluntary nature of the policy was unacceptable to many," said Andrew Kimbrell, one of the early activists to oppose biotechnology and now the executive director of the Center for Food Safety, which filed the petition.
此次請愿行動由食品安全中心提出，該機構現任執行主管、很早就反對生物技術的激進人士之一安德魯•金柏利說道：“毫無疑問的是，許多人接受不了讓公司自定是否做轉基因測試、貼不貼標簽的政策。”
The F.D.A. policy has also helped organizations like Mr. Kimbrell's raise money. In late 1998 groups opposed to biotechnology approached the hundreds of foundations that give regularly to environmental causes and told them about the government's decision to let the companies regulate themselves. Since then, the foundations have given the groups several million dollars out of concern over the policy, said Christina Desser, a lawyer in San Francisco involved in the fund-raising effort.
F.D.A.的政策還有助于金柏利先生的食品安全中心籌措資金。1998年底，反對生物技術的團體與數百家定期資助環保事業的基金會進行接洽，并告知他們政府讓公司自行其是。自那時起，出于同樣的擔憂，各基金會已經向這些團體提供了數百萬美元資金，舊金山一位參與籌款工作的律師克里斯蒂娜•德塞如是說。
There was also an about-face in the approach to dealing with overseas markets. As the Clinton administration came to Washington, Monsanto maintained its close ties to policy makers particularly to trade negotiators. For example, Mr. Shapiro was friends with Mickey Kantor, the United States trade negotiator who would eventually be named a Monsanto director.
處理海外市場的方式也完全變了。自克林頓入主以來，孟山都公司一直與決策者尤其是貿易談判代表保持著密切聯系。例如，夏皮羅先生的朋友米基•坎特就是美國貿易談判代表，后來被孟山都公司任命為董事。
Confrontation in trade negotiations became the order of the day. Senior administration officials publicly disparaged the concerns of European consumers as the products of conservative minds unfamiliar with the science.
貿易談判中的對峙成為家常便飯。美國政府高級官員公然貶低歐洲消費者的擔憂為科盲和保守。
"You can't put a gun to their head," Mr. Harbison said of the toughened trade strategy with Europe. "It just won't sell."
“你不能用槍指著他們的頭，”哈比森先生如是評論對歐洲的強硬貿易策略。“這樣不了賣東西。”
And it didn't. Protests erupted in Europe, and genetically modified foods became the rallying point of a vast political opposition. Exports of the foods slowed to a stop. With a vocal and powerful opposition growing in both Europe and America, the perceived promise of biotechnology foods began to slip away.
真的就是不行。歐洲爆發了抗議，轉基因食物成了政治反對派的聚會目標。轉基因食物的出口漸停了。歐洲和美國都出現了強有力的反對派，生物技術食品的承諾漸漸消失。
By the end of the decade, the magnitude of Monsanto's error in abandoning its slow, velvet-glove strategy of the 1980's was apparent. Mr. Shapiro himself acknowledged as much. In the fall of 1999, he appeared at a conference sponsored by Greenpeace, the environmental group and major biotechnology critic.
到了20世紀90年代末才看出，孟山都公放棄80年代的外柔內剛戰略是巨大的錯誤。夏皮羅承認這一點。1999年秋，他出席過綠色和平組織的一個會議，那是一個環保組織，也是生物技術最主要的批評者。
There, while declaring his faith in biotechnology, Mr. Shapiro acknowledged that his company was guilty of "condescension or indeed arrogance" in its efforts to promote the new foods. But it was too late for a recovery. Soon after that speech, with the company's stock price in the doldrums because of its struggles with agricultural biotechnology, Monsanto itself ended its existence as an independent company. It was taken over by Pharmacia, a New Jersey drug company.
在會上，夏皮羅先生仍表示堅信生物技術，但也承認在推行中他的公司犯了錯誤，“高高在上甚至太傲慢”。后悔也來不及了。那次會后不久，在農業生物科技上的表現讓公司的股價大跌;孟山都公司被新澤西州的一個醫藥公司接管，不再是一家獨立的公司了。
In recent months, biotechnology has been struggling with the consequences of its blunders. Leading food companies like Frito-Lay and Gerber have said they will avoid certain bioengineered food. And grain companies like Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill have asked farmers to separate their genetically modified foods from their traditional ones. That, in turn, creates complex, costly and as the Starlink fiasco shows at times flawed logistical requirements for farmers.
最近幾個月，生物技術業界一直掙扎在自己犯下的重大錯誤里。食品公司巨頭菲多利公司和格柏公司表示要避免某些轉基因食物。糧食公司阿徹丹尼爾斯米德蘭公司和嘉吉公司建議農場主把傳統食物與轉基因食物分隔開。星聯(玉米)的慘敗更表明，對農民提出的這些要求其實是多么復雜、多么昂貴，并且根本沒有用。
Efforts have been made by industry and government to assuage public concerns although critics of the technology maintain that the attempts do not go far enough. Last week, the F.D.A. announced proposed rule changes requiring the submission of certain information that used to be provided voluntarily. But even supporters of the rule change say that it will make little practical difference in the way the business works, since companies have universally submitted all such information in the past, even under the voluntary standard.
業界和政府盡量緩和公眾的擔憂，但批評者認為做的很差。上周美國食品藥物管理局宣布將變更規責，要企業提交某些信息，此前只是自愿提交。連支持新規的人都說，這改變不了轉基因食品行業的運作，因為所有的公司以前都自愿提交過被提及的那些信息。
And the industry itself has started down a new path, with a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign promoting genetically engineered foods as safe products that provide enormous benefits to populations around the world an effort that some food industry officials say has come 10 years too late.
業界轉向一條新路，投資幾百萬美元的廣告宣傳轉基因食物安全并給世界人口帶了了巨大的利益。食品產業的某些人士認為，10年前就該這樣干了。
"For the price of what it would have cost to market a new breakfast cereal, the biotech industry probably could have saved itself a lot of the struggle that it is going through today," said Gene Grabowski, a spokesman with the Grocery Manufacturers of America, a trade group.
“看看推出一款新的早餐麥片要付出多少代價，生物技術可以免除很多艱辛，”吉恩·格拉博夫斯基說道，他是美國雜貨生產商(一家貿易集團)的發言人。
And in recent weeks, Monsanto itself has announced plans to chart a new course one with striking similarity to the course abandoned in 1992 reviving its outside consultations with environmental, consumer and other groups with concerns or interest in the technology.
近幾周來，孟山都公司公布了一個新方案，與1992年前的道路驚人地相似。它要重啟同外部咨詢顧問的商討，其中包括環保組織、消費者群體等。他們或者是擔憂，或者是興趣。
For the corporate veterans who set the original strategy, this is scant solace. A dream they had worked so hard to achieve had, at the very least, been set back by years.
對于制定過公司最初戰略的前輩來說，這起不到安慰作用。他們為止奮斗的夢想至少被延誤多年。
"You can't imagine how I have bled over this," said Mr. Carpenter, the former head of biotechnology strategy for Monsanto. "They lost the battle for the public trust."
“你想象不到我在這件事上付出多少汗水，”孟山都公司生物技術戰略的前任負責人卡彭特先生說道。“他們輸掉了公眾信任。”
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